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Covenants and Equitable Servitudes in California
'If two landowners enter into an agreement respecting the use of
their land, the agreement as between them is enforceable in contract.1
If one of the landowners subsequently sells his land and the other
landowner seeks enforcement against the transferee who has not as-
sumed the obligation of the contract, the agreement can only be en-
forced as a covenant running with the land or through the equity
powers of the court.2 In California there are two major provisions for
covenants running with the land, Civil Code sections 1462 and 1468.1
Each section has its own set of requirements that must be met before
a covenant can run with the land, and if the covenant fails to run under
one, it may run under the other. If the covenant fails to run un-
der either section, the court may still enforce it against a transferee
taking with notice.4 This Note will explore the statutory covenants
and the circumstances under which a court should grant equitable
enforcement.0
The Note first considers the four common law prerequisites to
running covenants. The Note then analyzes Civil Code section 1462
and how the courts have misunderstood and unduly limited the sec-
tion. The original provisions of section 1468 are briefly considered,
followed by a more detailed analysis of the section as amended. The
Note then traces the development in California of equitable servitudes.
The Note points out that amended section 1468 will eventually sup-
plant traditional equitable enforcement and suggests that the courts
reconsider their equitable enforcement powers. The final section of
the Note discusses various rules of construction, enforcement, and ter-
mination applicable to both covenants and equitable servitudes.
Historical Background
A covenant is a promise by one party to do or refrain from doing
a certain thing." The person making the promise is the covenantor
and the one receiving the benefit is the covenantee. Between the
1. Grange Co. v. Simmons, 203 Cal. App. 2d 567, 573, 21 Cal. Rptr. 757, 760
(1962); Barrows v. Jackson, 112 Cal. App. 2d 534, 537-38, 247 P.2d 99, 102 (1952).
2. Werner v. Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 179-80, 183 P. 945, 947 (1919).
3. (West 1954 & Supp. 1977).
4. Marra v. Aetna Constr. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 375, 378, 101 P.2d 490, 492 (1940).
5. The Note will not discuss covenants of title or covenants in a lease.
6. Hunt v. United Bank & Trust Co., 210 Cal. 108, 115, 291 P. 184, 187 (1930);
O'Sullivan v. Griffith, 153 Cal. 502, 506, 95 P. 873, 875 (1908).
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original covenanting parties there is a contract, and any action to en-
force the covenant would be in contract.7 If either the covenantor
or covenantee sells his property, the question arises whether the trans-
feree of the covenantor is bound or whether the transferee of the cov-
enantee has any right of enforcement. If the covenantor specifically
delegated the burden of the covenant to his transferee and the trans-
feree assumed the obligation, the agreement could still be enforced
in contract." Likewise, if the covenantee assigned his rights to his
transferee, the transferee could enforce the contractY If no delega-
tion or assignment were made, however, the promise could not be
enforced in contract. 10
At early common law, assignment of contract rights and delega-
tion of duties were not recognized," so that even if the parties wanted
to continue the life of the contract, the covenantor could not delegate
the duty to a transferee, and the covenantee could not assign his bene-
fit. Yet the early common law recognized a need for the continuation
of promises respecting the use of property, and out of that recognition
arose the concept of covenants that run with the land.' 2  The burden
of the covenant was said to run with the land of the covenantor, and
the benefit ran with the land of the covenantee, so that any subsequent
grantee acquiring the land of either the covenantor or covenantee
would also acquire the burden or the benefit.' 3
There is some dispute as to how the concept of running covenants
developed at common law,14 but the important consideration today is
the prerequisites for a covenant to run with the land. There is general
agreement that at common law four requirements must be met before
the covenant will run: (1) the covenant must be in writing, (2) the
original parties to the promise must intend the covenant to run, (3)
the covenant must have some relationship to the land, and (4) the
party seeking to enforce the covenant must be in privity of estate with
the party against whom the covenant is enforced.' 5
7. Grange Co. v. Simmons, 203 Cal. App. 2d 567, 573, 21 Cal. Rptr. 757, 760
(1962); Barrows v. Jackson, 112 Cal. App. 2d 534, 537-38, 247 P.2d 99, 102 (1952).
8. Citizens Suburban Co. v. Rosemont Dev. Co., 244 Cal. App. 2d 666, 675,
53 Cal. Rptr. 551, 557 (1966). See also Werner v. Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 179, 183
P. 945, 947 (1919).
9. Pedro v. County of Humboldt, 217 Cal. 493, 496-97, 19 P.2d 776-77 (1933);
Lyford v. North Pac. Coast R.R. Co., 92 Cal. 93, 96, 28 P. 103, 104 (1891).
10. See Werner v. Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 179, 183 P. 945, 947 (1919).
11. 5 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 671 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as POWELL]; 4 A. CoasrN, CoNT.RACTS § 856 (1951).
12. POWELL, supra note 11, at 671.
13. Id. n.3.
14. C. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHIcH "RuN WiTH LAND"
119-22 (2d ed. 1947) [hereinafter cited as CLARK].
15. Id. at 94; POWELL, supra note 11, at 672-75.
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Necessity of a Writing
Because a promise respecting the use of land creates an interest
in property the Statute of Frauds applies, and the promise must be
in writing to be valid.10 The courts in California have been adamant
in refusing to give effect to an oral promise, even when it would appear
equitable to do so.17
In numerous California cases a subdivider has orally promised his
purchasers that he was putting covenants in all the deeds to limit a
tract of land to single family residences but through either negligence
or intentional deception has failed to act on the promise.'3 Although
the purchasers relied upon the developer's oral representations, the
courts have refused to enforce the oral promise against the developer
or those taking with notice.19  In light of the basic principle of equity
that land use restrictions will be enforced against those taking with
notice,2 0 the refusal of the California courts to give effect to the re-
strictions seems both harsh and inconsistent with modern practice.21
If there is no dispute that the oral promise has been made, neither
the developer nor his successors taking with notice should be allowed
to invoke the Statute of Frauds to obtain an advantage over those who
acquired the property in reliance upon the oral representations.22
16. The California Statute of Frauds is embodied in CAL. Crv. CODE § 1624 (West
1973): "The following contracts are invalid, unless the same, or some note or mem-
orandum thereof, is in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by his
agent: . . . An agreement ... for the sale of real property, or of an interest there-
in .... - See also Riley v. Bear Creek Planning Comm., 17 Cal. 3d 500, 509-10, 551
P.2d 1213, 1220, 131 Cal. Rptr. 381, 388 (1976). CAL. Crv. CoDE § 1462 (West
1954) provides for covenants contained in a "grant of an estate" and a "grant" is de-
fined in CAL. Civ. CODE § 1053 (West 1970) as a transfer in writing. CAL. Civ. CODE
§ 1468 (West Supp. 1977) also contemplates the covenant will be in writing, because
the land benefited by the covenant must be particularly described and the instrument
containing the covenant must be recorded.
17. E.g., Riley v. Bear Creek Planning Comm., 17 Cal. 3d 500, 551 P.2d 1213,
131 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1976); Martin v. Holm, 197 Cal. 733, 742-43, 242 P. 718, 722
(1925).
18. See, e.g., Smith v. Rasqui, 176 Cal. App. 2d 514, 1 Cal. Eptr. 478 (1959);
Blodgett v. Trumbull, 83 Cal. App. 566, 257 P. 199 (1927).
19. Riley v. Bear Creek Planning Comm., 17 Cal. 3d 500, 551 P.2d 1213, 131
Cal. Rptr. 381 (1976); Murry v. Lovell, 132 Cal. App. 2d 30, 281 P.2d 316 (1955).
The possible finding of an estoppel against the developer in Smith v. Rasqui, 176 Cal.
App. 2d 514, 1 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1959), was expressly disapproved in Riley v. Bear Creek
Planning Comm., 17 Cal. 3d 500, 512, 551 P.2d 1213, 1222, 131 Cal. Rptr. 381, 390
(1976).
20. Marra v. Aetna Constr. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 375, 378, 101 P.2d 490, 492 (1940);
2 J. Pommoy, EQurry JuBISPRuDENcCE 689 (1886); see text accompanying notes 116-18
infra.
21. PowELL, supra note 11, at 7 672. See also J. CAL.4 m & J. PaRULLo, THE
LAW OF CoNmrAcTs §§ 6-8 & 6-13 (2d ed. 1977).
22. The purpose of the Statute of Frauds is to prevent fraud and perjury. Riley
The Statute of Frauds has a further requirement that the writing
be signed by the person against whom it is enforced. 23  The accept-
ance of a deed or written instrument containing the covenant, however,
is considered the equivalent of signing an agreement to perform the
promise.24  Thus the promise must be in writing, but it need not be
signed by the promisor.
Intent of the Parties
Unless the original parties to the covenant intend that the cov-
enant bind their successors in interest, the covenant will be considered
personal to them.25  Although formal or technical terms such as "as-
signs" may be used to show intent, such technical terms are generally
not necessary. 26  Under the common law and the provisions of Civil
Code section 1462, intent can be shown by a statement in the deed
that the covenant runs with the land.27  Under Civil Code section
1468, however, a more specific statement of intent may be required.2
The intent of the parties should be analyzed separately as to the
running of the benefit and the running of the burden.2 9  Under the
common law and Civil Code section 1462, express words are not neces-
sary for the benefit of a covenant to run. An intent that the benefit
pass may be determined from the nature and subject matter of the
covenant. 30  Thus, if the covenant is beneficial to the land and does
not seem to be personal to the covenantee, the benefit passes as an in-
v. Bear Creek Planning Comm., 17 Cal. 3d 500, 509, 551 P.2d 1213, 1220, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 381, 388 (1976). The irony is that here the statute can be used by the sub-
divider and his successors taking with notice as a tool to perpetrate a fraud upon pur-
chasers relying upon the oral representations. See Blodgett v. Trumbull, 83 Cal. App.
566, 257 P. 199 (1927).
23. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624 (West 1973): "The following contracts are invalid,
unless the same, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing and subscribed
by the party to be charged or by his agent .... "
24. Riley v. Bear Creek Planning Comm., 17 Cal. 3d 500, 511 n.6, 551 P2d 1213,
1221, 131 Cal. Rptr. 381, 389 (1976); Grange Co. v. Simmons, 203 Cal. App. 2d 567,
573, 21 Cal. Rptr. 757, 760 (1962).
25. See Los Angeles Terminal Land Co. v. Muir, 136 Cal. 36, 42, 68 P. 308, 310
(1902); Heimburge v. State Guar. Corp., 116 Cal. App. 380, 383, 2 P.2d 998, 999
(1931).
26. Pedro v. County of Humboldt, 217 Cal. 493, 497, 19 P.2d 776, 777 (1933);
Sacramento Suburban Fruit Lands Co. v. Whaley, 50 Cal. App. 125, 133, 194 P. 1054,
1057 (1920).
27. Stanislaus Water Co. v. Bachman, 152 Cal. 716, 728, 93 P. 858 (1908).
28. See text accompanying notes 89 & 105 infra.
29. CLARK, supra note 14, at 101-11. See Harrison v. Domergue, 274 Cal. App.
2d 19, 22-23, 78 Cal. Rptr. 797, 798-800 (1969).
30. Pedro v. County of Humboldt, 217 Cal. 493, 497, 19 P.2d 776, 777 (1933);
Sacramento Suburban Fruit Lands Co. v. Whaley, 50 Cal. App. 125, 133, 194 P. 1054,
1057 (1920).
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cident to the ownership of the land. For example, a covenant to main-
tain a ditch to prevent salt water flooding was transferable to a grantee
of the covenantee without any mention in the deed of an intent that
the covenant run with the land.31 Under Civil Code section 1468,
however, the covenant may have to state expressly that it is for the
benefit of the land of the covenantee before the benefit will run, if
the courts strictly construe the provisions of that section.82
If the parties wish the burden of a covenant to pass, under both
the common law and under the provisions of sections 1462 and 1468,
they must expressly state their intent. Because there is a judicial
preference for the free use of land, covenants burdening the land will
be strictly construed,3 3 and courts will be slow to declare a burden
on real property.8 4
Relationship to the Land
If a covenant is to bind whoever is the owner of the land, logically
the covenant must relate to the land, or, as is sometimes said, the cov-
enant must "touch and concern" the land.35 The promise, however,
need not physically concern the land but may affect only the title or
interest in the estate of the covenantee.36  For example, a covenant
providing for the removal of a lien unfetters title and directly benefits
the land.37 Likewise, a covenant to quitclaim oil rights restores the
rights to the landowner and benefits the land.38  Promises to take out
insurance, to repair, and to develop mineral resources are covenants
relating to the land.39
Privity of Estate
Considerable disagreement exists among legal scholars and among
jurisdictions as to what constitutes privity of estate.40  Privity means
a "connection of interest," and the requirement of privity of estate
means a sufficient connection between two parties such that one party
31. Pedro v. County of Humboldt, 217 Cal. 493, 19 P.2d 776 (1933).
32. See text accompanying notes 86-87 & 97-105 infra.
33. Los Angeles Terminal Land Co. v. Muir, 136 Cal. 36, 44, 68 P. 308, 310-11
(1902).
34. Bresee v. Dunn, 178 Cal. 96, 100, 172 P. 387, 389 (1918).
35. POWELL, supra note 11, at ff 675.
36. Carlson v. Lindauer, 119 Cal. App. 2d 292, 304-05, 259 P.2d 925, 931 (1953);
Sacramento Suburban Fruit Lands Co. v. Whaley, 50 Cal. App. 125, 130, 194 P. 1054,
1056 (1920).
37. Sacramento Suburban Fruit Lands Co. v. Whaley, 50 Cal. App. 125, 130, 194
P. 1054, 1056 (1920).
38. Carlson v. Lindauer, 119 Cal. App. 2d 292, 305, 259 P.2d 925, 929 (1953).
39. Richardson v. Callahan, 213 Cal. 683, 688, 3 P.2d 927, 929 (1931).
40. CLA.tK, supra note 14, at 92-93.
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can enforce an agreement concerning an estate in land against the
other party.41  Between the original covenanting parties there is priv-
ity of contract, and the agreement is enforceable in contract.42 If
one of the original parties transfers his land, the transferee is not in
privity of contract, and the covenant can only be enforced if the
transferee is in privity of estate.43
Suppose A owns two parcels of land and conveys one parcel to
B with a promise from B that the land will be used only for a resi-
dence.44  If B later conveys the land to Y, whether Y is in privity of
estate with A depends on how privity is defined, and it has been defined
in the various jurisdictions in four different ways.45
The strictest definition of privity requires a tenurial relationship
between the parties - that one party holds his estate subordinate to
the other party. A tenurial relationship is found in a lease, in which
the tenant holds subordinate to the landlord and in a life estate, in
which the life tenant holds subordinate to the reversioner.4 6  If either
41. Id. at 112-13.
42. Grange Co. v. Simmons, 203 Cal. App. 2d 567, 573, 21 Cal. Rptr. 757, 760
(1962).
43. Werner v. Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 180, 183 P. 945, 947 (1919); Los Angeles
Terminal Land Co. v. Muir, 136 Cal. 36, 41, 68 P. 308, 309 (1902). These two
California cases are cited as a reflection of general common law and not of California
law. Although privity of estate is required at common law for the enforcement of a
covenant, California is governed by statute that does away with the privity of estate
requirement. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1462 & 1468 (West 1954 & Supp. 1977); POWELL,
supra note 11, ff 674, at 180. The California courts, however, have misunderstood and
at times ignored California statutes. See notes 48-64 & accompanying text infra.
44. Covenants usually involve at least two transfers of land, first from a grantor
to a grantee and then to a later subsequent grantee. The relationship of the parties
can be more easily understood if the following diagram is kept in mind:
A B
X Y
A is the original grantor conveying a parcel of land to B. At the time of that conveyance
a covenant is made, either A's promising something with respect to the land he retains
or B's promising something with respect to the land she receives. Subsequently, one
or both of the following transactions occur: A transfers all or part of his remaining
land to X or B transfers her land to Y. A and B are the original covenanting parties,
and X and Y are their respective transferees.
45. POWELL, supra note 11, at ff 674 (identifies four kinds of privity); CLARx, supra
note 14, at 111-43 (identifies three kinds of privity). The discussion in the text fol-
lows the four definitions given by Powell.
46. A tenurial relationship also includes an estate for years.
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the tenant or the life tenant conveys his entire estate to a transferee,
the transferee continues to hold the estate subordinate to the landlord
or the reversioner. The transferee is placed in a tenurial relationship
with the landlord or reversioner, and any covenants the original tenant
made devolve onto the transferee. If A gives B a lease and B assigns
the lease to Y, the benefits and burdens of B's covenants pass to Y.
A slightly less restrictive definition of privity requires a simulta-
neous or mutual interest between the parties. This second definition
includes not only the lease and life estate but also cotenancies. 47
The landlord has a simultaneous interest in the same parcel of land
as the tenant; the landlord owns the reversionary interest, and the
tenant owns an estate for term. Likewise, the life-estate reversioner
owns a simultaneous interest with the life-tenant. Cotenants own a
simultaneous, equal, and undivided interest in the cotenancy. If A
and B are cotenants and B conveys his share to Y, Y acquires an equal
and undivided interest in the cotenancy and has a simultaneous interest
in the same land as A. The benefit and burden of the covenants
between A and B pass to Y.
A third definition establishes privity between a grantor and
grantee. The only requirement for privity under this definition is
that the covenant be created at the time of the conveyance of an estate.
This definition includes covenants contained in a deed conveying a
leasehold, a life estate, a cotenancy interest and adds, most impor-
tantly, covenants contained in a deed conveying a fee. Covenants
between two persons who already own their respective interests in
land are not included. As long as the covenant is contained in the
deed conveying any estate from A to B, the covenant will run to the
transferee Y.
The fourth and most liberal definition establishes privity between
any parties who are successors in interest to the original covenantor and
covenantee. The covenant can be created either in the conveyance
of an estate or between two parties who are already landowners. The
only requirement is that the transferee acquire an estate that is bene-
fited or burdened by a covenant. If A and B are adjoining land-
owners at the time B makes his promise to A and B later sells his land
to Y, Y is bound by the promise as a successor in interest to the land
of B.
California follows at least the tenurial definition of privity, estab-
lishing privity of estate between a landlord and tenant and between
a reversioner and life tenant.48  California also appears to follow the
47. The holder of an easement also has a simultaneous interest with the owner
of the fee.
48. See Standard Oil Co. v. Slye, 164 Cal. 435, 442, 129 P. 589, 591 (1913);
Bonetti v. Treat, 91 Cal. 223, 229, 27 P. 612, 613 (1891); Salisbury v. Shirley, 66 Cal.
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simultaneous or mutual definition, establishing privity between coten-
ants. Although no California case has directly decided that privity
of estate exists between cotenants, two cases discussed covenants
running between cotenants under the apparent assumption that priv-
ity did exist.4 9 California has unquestionably rejected the grantor-
grantee and successor-in-interest definitions.5 0  In the early case of
Los Angeles Terminal Land Co. v. Muir, 1 the court adopted the view
that if there is a conveyance of the fee, no reversion is left in the
grantor, and no privity of estate can exist between the grantor and
grantee and their successors in interest. The court added, however,
that even if there is no privity of estate, the benefit of a covenant can
run, but the burden never runs.5 2
223, 225-26, 5 P. 104, 106 (1884). No California case was found specifically holding
there is privity of estate between a life tenant and a reversioner. Because a tenurial
relationship exists, the reasoning of the cases establishing privity between a landlord
and a tenant must apply.
49. Harrison v. Domergue, 274 Cal. App. 2d 19, 78 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1969); Hig-
gins v. Monckton, 28 Cal. App. 2d 723, 83 P.2d 516 (1938). In Harrison the covenant
was held not to run with the land because the purpose of the covenant had ceased.
In Higgins the covenant was not enforceable by the plaintiff-lessees because they did
not acquire the entire estate of their lessors. For a discussion of this requirement, see
note 205 & accompanying text infra.
50. See Werner v. Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 180, 183 P. 945, 947 (1919); Bryant
v. Whitney, 178 Cal. 640, 643, 174 P. 32, 33 (1918); Gamble v. Fierman, 82 Cal.
App. 180, 182, 255 P. 269, 270 (1927).
51. 136 Cal. 36, 41-42, 68 P. 308, 309-10 (1902).
52. By 1834 the English courts had decided that although the burden of a cove-
nant did not run between owners in fee, the benefit did run. The English courts de-
cided that only a tenurial relationship satisfied privity of estate, and burdens only
ran if there was such a tenurial relationship. Berger, A Policy Analysis of Promises
Respecting the Use of Land, 55 MINN. L. REV. 167, 180 (1970). Most American
jurisdictions, on the other hand, moved away from the strict definition of privity and
held privity of estate existed between a grantor and grantee, thus allowing the running
of both burdens and benefits between owners in fee. Id. at 181. Whether the Muir
court was attempting to adopt the English view is unclear. In support of its discussion
that only benefits run, the court quoted Rawle on Covenants for Title (W. RAWLE,
PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COVENANTS FOR TITLE (3d ed. 1860)). Cov-
enants of title are related to covenants respecting the use of land, but they are sig-
nificantly different.
The general rule is that if there is a conveyance of a fee, only the benefit of a
covenant of title runs, and the burden does not run. POWELL, supra note 11, ff 911.
Covenants of title in the conveyance of a fee, however, are intrinsically limited to the
running of the benefit because the covenant only affects the title of the land conveyed.
The covenant has no relationship to any land the grantor may have retained. Cove-
nants respecting the use of land, however, do intrinsically involve the running of ben-
efits and burdens because both the benefited and burdened property are affected by
the covenant. B's promise to restrict his land to residential use burdens his land for
the benefit of A's retained land.
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The court's conclusion that a benefit runs but a burden never
runs is at best mere dicta and at worst contrary to the provisions of the
California statutory covenants as they were enacted in 1872. The
Muir case concerned a grantor who had imposed a burdensome cov-
enant on his grantee and was seeking to enforce the burden against
a transferee of the grantee. The case did not involve the running of
a benefit; therefore the discussion of benefits was irrelevant. The bur-
den imposed on the Muir grantee did not run under the provisions of
the statutes,53 but failure of the burden to run in this case does not
mean a burden never runs. To the contrary, if a covenant is for the
benefit of the land of the grantee, the statutes expressly provide for
the running of the burden on the grantor's land.54 The court's state-
ment that a burden never runs was either broad dicta or contrary to
the express provisions of the California Civil Code.
Statutory Scheme
Sections 1462 and 1460
When the Civil Code was enacted in 1872, the main provisions
for running covenants were sections 1462 and 1460.5 The sections
remain the same today. Section 146256 provides that a covenant runs
The Muir court inappropriately cited a treatise concerning covenants of title in
support of its decision that only a benefit runs in a covenant respecting the use of
land. The court failed to analyze why only the benefit should run in a covenant re-
specting the use of land. The court's discussion also failed to consider the California
statutory provisions which allow the running of burdens. Civil Code sections 1462
and 1460.
53. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1462 (West 1954) provides that in order for a covenant
to run it must be for the direct benefit of the property conveyed. See also Pedro v.
County of Humboldt, 217 Cal. 493, 496, 19 P.2d 776, 777 (1933); Lyford v. North
Pac. Coast R.R. Co., 92 Cal. 93, 95, 28 P. 103 (1891). The Muir court correctly held
the restriction in question was a burden to the land conveyed and did not run under
§ 1462. Los Angeles Terminal Land Co. v. Muir, 136 Cal. 36, 41, 68 P. 308, 309
(1902); accord, Marra v. Aetna Constr. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 375, 377-78, 101 P.2d 490,
492 (1940).
54. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1462 and 1460 (West 1954) must be read together. See
generally notes 55-71 & accompanying text infra. Section 1462 provides that a cov-
enant contained in a grant of real property runs with the land if it is for the direct
benefit of the land conveyed. Section 1460 provides that a covenant that runs with
the land binds the assigns of the covenantor and vests in the assigns of the covenantee.
See also Coulter v. Sausalito flay Water Co., 122 Cal. App. 480, 493-94, 10 P.2d 780,
785 (1932).
55. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1460, 1462 (1872) (see the transmittal letter at the front).
Section 1462 is logically followed by section 1460, therefore they are considered in
reverse order.
56. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1462 (West 1954): "Every covenant contained in a grant
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with the land if it is contained in a grant of an estate and if it is for
the direct benefit of the land conveyed. The section establishes two
requirements: the covenant must be contained in the conveyance
of an estate 57 and it must be for the benefit of the estate conveyed51
Section 146059 provides that if a covenant runs with the land, it is
binding on the transferees of the covenantor and vests in the trans-
ferees of the covenantee. Under the section, both the burden and the
benefit run. When the court in Los Angeles Terminal Land Co. v.
Muir0 stated that only the benefit ran, it ignored section 1460, which
expressly provides for the running of both the benefit and the burden.
The Muir court could have limited the application of sections
1462 and 1460 to covenants contained in the conveyance of a lease or
a life estate. Section 1462 requires only that the covenant be in a
grant of an estate. The section does not specify what kinds of estates
are included, and the court could have omitted the conveyance of
a fee. The court could then have reasoned that because benefits and
burdens run only if there is a conveyance of less than a fee and because
the statutes allow the running of benefits and burdens, the statutes
must therefore only apply when there is a conveyance of less than a
fee. The court's decision would then have been consistent with the
statutes.
The Muir court, however, stated that the benefit of a covenant
runs with the conveyance of a fee and cited section 1462 in support.61
If section 1462 includes the conveyance of a fee and the benefit runs
then under section 1460 the burden must also run. Section 1462 is
basically a definition of the kinds of covenants that run with the land:
those that are for the benefit of the estate conveyed. 62  Section 1460
of an estate in real property, which is made for the direct benefit of the property, or
some part of it then in existence, runs with the land."
57. See generally Fresno Canal & Irrigation Co. v. Rowell, 80 Cal. 114, 22 P. 53
(1889).
58. See generally Marra v. Aetna Constr. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 375, 377-78, 101 P.2d
490, 492 (1940); Pedro v. County of Humboldt, 217 Cal. 493, 496, 19 P.2d 776, 777
(1933); Lyford v. North Pac. Coast R.R. Co., 92 Cal. 93, 95, 28 P. 103 (1891); Carl-
son v. Lindauer, 119 Cal. App. 2d 292, 304, 259 P.2d 925, 931 (1953).
59. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1460 (West 1954): "Certain covenants, contained in
grants of estates in real property, are appurtenant to such estates, and pass with them,
so as to bind the assigns of the covenantor and to vest in the assigns of the covenantee,
in the same manner as if they had personally entered into them. Such covenants are
said to run with the land." See generally Coulter v. Sausalito Bay Water Co., 122
Cal. App. 480, 493, 10 P.2d 780, 785 (1932).
60. 136 Cal. 36, 41, 68 P. 308, 309 (1902).
61. Id.
62. See Pedro v. County of Humboldt, 217 Cal. 493, 496, 19 P.2d 776, 777
(1933); Lyford v. North Pac. Coast R.R. Co., 92 Cal. 93, 95, 28 P. 103 (1891).
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defines what a running covenant does: it binds the transferee of the
covenantor and vests in the transferee of the covenantee.G3 If a par-
ticular covenant is within the definition of section 1462, the covenant
must necessarily run as described in section 1460. The general rule
of statutory construction is that the various parts of a statutory enact-
ment must be read together as a whole. Each section must be given
effect if possible, and any construction making some parts surplus-
age should be avoided.6 4 The Muir court was in error in construing
section 1462 without considering section 1460.
The Muir decision created an uncertainty as to the meaning of
sections 1462 and 1460 that persists.0 5 Muir stated that in the con-
veyance of a fee the benefit runs but the burden never runs. Sections
1462 and 1460 provide that both the benefit and the burden run if
the covenant is for the benefit of the land conveyed. The uncertainty
can be resolved in one of two ways. The Muir statement that benefits
run and burdens never run can be dismissed as broad dicta, and the
holding of the case can be limited to the well-accepted rule that under
section 1462 the burden does not run on the grantee's land. A prefer-
able resolution is an interpretation that would reconcile Muir with the
statutes. From such a reconciliation the rule emerges that benefits
and burdens run under the statutes, but if for some reason a covenant
fails to run under the statutes, the benefit can run in any case. The
better rule is that the benefit always runs if the covenanting parties
intended it to run, but the burden only runs if it qualifies under the
statute.
The scope of sections 1462 and 1460 can be most readily under-
stood by way of example. Suppose A owns two adjoining parcels of
land and conveys one parcel to B with the promise from B that the
land will be used only for a residence. B, on the other hand, must
receive her water from a well located on A's land. A therefore prom-
ises in the deed to B that A will maintain the well on his land and
supply B with water. Thus the grantee has made a promise con-
cerning the property conveyed, and the grantor has made a promise
concerning an adjoining parcel that the grantor retains.
If B later conveys her land to Y and A for some reason stops sup-
plying the water, Y will have no difficulty enforcing the covenant to
supply water against A. A's promise is a benefit to the land conveyed
63. See Coulter v. Sausalito Bay Water Co., 122 Cal. App. 480, 493, 10 P.2d 780,
785 (1932).
64. Moyer v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 10 Cal. 3d 222, 230, 514
P.2d 1224, 1229, 110 Cal. Rptr. 144, 149 (1973); Van Nuis v. Los Angeles Soap Co.,
36 Cal. App. 3d 222, 228-29, 111 Cal. Rptr. 398, 402 (1973).
65. See e.g., CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, tviEW OF SE-
LECED 1968 CODE LEGISLATION 33 (1968).
to B, and the benefit runs with the land to the grantee's transferee,
Y.66
If A conveys his remaining parcel to X, however, and X stops
supplying the water to the land of B, the California courts have had
difficulty in deciding that the burden of A's promise devolves onto X
and that B can enforce the promise as a covenant running with the
land. In several cases a grantor had promised to supply water to a
grantee, and the grantee sought to enforce the promise against a trans-
feree of the grantor.67  Each time the court held that the grantee
could enforce the covenant but never on the ground there was a cov-
enant running with the land. The oldest case reasoned that the water
was still a part of the grantor's realty until it actually flowed onto the
grantee's land. Thus the promise to supply water was an executory
contract for the sale of land which could be enforced against a suc-
cessor in interest who took with notice of the agreement of sale."8
Although the courts did not mention Los Angeles Terminal Land
Co. v. Muir, 9 they were no doubt aware of the case and had difficulty
allowing the running of a burden when there had been a conveyance
of a fee. As previously noted, the Muir court was in error in stating
that the burden did not run.70 The facts of the water cases com-
pletely satisfied the statutory requirements for the running of a cov-
enant: the covenants were contained in the conveyances of estates
and were for the direct benefit of the lands conveyed. Under section
1460, therefore, the covenants were binding on the transferees of the
grantor-covenantors and vested in the transferees of the grantee-cov-
enantees. The covenants ran with the land. Under a correct inter-
pretation of Muir and a correct application of the statutes, B in the
example above can enforce A's promise to supply water against A's
transferee, X.71
If B conveys her land to Y, A cannot enforce the promise to use
the land only for a residence. B's promise imposes a burden on the
66. See Carlson v. Lindauer, 119 Cal. App. 2d 292, 259 P.2d 925 (1953).
67. Relovich v. Stuart, 211 Cal. 422, 295 P. 819 (1931); Henrici v. South Feather
Land & Water Co., 177 Cal. 442, 170 P. 1135 (1918); Stanislaus Water Co. v. Bach-
man, 152 Cal. 716, 93 P. 858 (1908).
68. Stanislaus Water Co. v. Bachman, 152 Cal. 716, 728, 93 P. 858, 863 (1908).
The later cases built upon the basic holding of Stanislaw. Henrici v. South Feather
Land & Water Co., 177 Cal. 442, 448, 170 P. 1135, 1137 (1918), held the agreement
to furnish water conferred upon the grantee an unspecified interest in real property
that affected the grantor's land. Relovich v. Stuart, 211 Cal. 422, 428, 295 P. 819,
821 (1931), held the grantee had an easement to take water from the land retained
by the grantor.
69. 136 Cal. 36, 68 P. 308 (1902).
70. See notes 56-58 & accompanying text supra.
71. If B conveys his land to Y, Y can also enforce the covenant against X.
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land conveyed, and section 1462 requires that the covenant be a
benefit. 72  In numerous decisions the courts have held that a cov-
enant imposing a burden on the land of the grantee does not run
with the land to the transferee of the grantee. 73  Y can use the land
for nonresidential purposes.
If A conveys the remaining parcel to X and X seeks to enforce
the residential-use promise against B only, an interesting question is
raised. The courts have held that section 1462 is a definitional pro-
vision and that if a covenant is not a benefit to the land conveyed,
it is not a covenant that runs with the land at all. Neither the bur-
den nor the benefit runs. 74  The running of a benefit, however, should
be considered as a separate question from the running of a burden.75
If the benefit is not allowed to run, B is relieved of her contractual
obligation to restrict her land to residential use by the fortuitous con-
veyance of the remaining parcel from A to X. The courts have held
that the benefit can be assigned to the transferee of the grantor, thus
preserving B's obligation. 76 The distinction thus becomes that the
benefit does not automatically run and that the grantor must specif-
ically assign it. If B has undertaken a contractual obligation, she
should not be relieved of her obligation simply because A has trans-
ferred his land to X and has failed specifically to assign his rights.
Policy considerations would favor continuing the benefit of the prom-
ise to X regardless of such an oversight on the part of A. Further-
more, under the preferred interpretation of Los Angeles Land Co. v.
Muir, the benefit of a covenant should always run, even if a covenant
fails to run under the statute.77  X should be able to enforce the
benefit of the covenant against the original covenantor, B.
The general rule under section 1462 is that before a covenant
runs with the grantee's land, the covenant must be a benefit to the
land. A corollary of the general rule is that if the covenant imposes
a burden but the burden results in a benefit to the grantee's land,
the burden runs along with the benefit to a transferee of the grantee.
72. Pedro v. County of Humboldt, 217 Cal. 493, 496, 19 P.2d 776, 777 (1933);
Lyford v. North Pac. Coast R.R. Co., 92 Cal. 93, 95, 28 P. 103 (1891).
73. Marra v. Aetna Constr. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 375, 101 P.2d 490 (1940); Werner
v. Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 183 P. 945 (1919); Berryman v. Hotel Savoy Co., 160 Cal.
559, 117 P. 677 (1911); Los Angeles Terminal Land Co. v. Muir, 136 Cal. 36, 68 P.
308 (1902).
74. Pedro v. County of Humboldt, 217 Cal. 493, 496, 19 P.2d 776, 777 (1933);
Lyford v. North Pac. Coast R.R. Co., 92 Cal. 93, 95, 28 P. 103 (1891).
75. CLARNK, supra note 14, at 101-11.
76. Pedro v. County of Humboldt, 217 Cal. 493, 19 P.2d 776 (1933); Lyford
v. North Pac. Coast R.R. Co., 92 Cal. 93, 28 P. 103 (1891).
77. See text following note 65 supra.
In Anthony v. Brea Glenbrook Club,78 the subdivider imposed a bur-
den on all the lot purchasers to become members and pay member-
ship dues to the subdivision recreation club. The court held that
maintenance of a well-kept clubhouse and swimming pool enhanced
the value of each lot in the subdivision and that the burden of main-
taining membership was in reality a benefit to the grantees' own land.
Thus the burden ran with the land as a benefit under section 1462.
A New York case decided in 1862 closely parallels the reasoning
of the Anthony decision. Denman v. Prince79 is one of several cases
listed in the original 1872 Annotated California Civil Code and its
precursor, the 1865 Field Code.80 In Denman v. Prince, a grantor
owned two mills, one of which he conveyed, promising at the time
of the conveyance to share in the expense of maintaining the dams
on the stream that provided power to the mills. The grantee later
incurred expenses in repairing the dams and sought to enforce the
promise against a transferee of the grantor's remaining mill. Al-
though there was no question the burden ran because under New York
law there was privity of estate, the court especially noted that the
burden of maintaining the dams was a benefit to the covenantor's own
land. Under well-established principles the covenantor was bound
to share the burden because he was at the same time receiving a
benefit.
As the law has developed under section 1462, if a covenant is
in a grant of an estate and is for the benefit of the estate conveyed,
the benefit of the covenant runs to a transferee of the grantee. Al-
though early cases created uncertainty, the statutes provide that the
burden of the covenant runs to the transferee of the grantor. If the
covenant imposes a burden on the land conveyed, the burden does
not run. Even though the courts have held that the benefit also
does not run, the better view is that the benefit should always run
if the original covenanting parties intended it to run, and the benefit
should run to the transferee of the grantor.
Section 1468
In 1905 the running of the burden was liberalized slightly when
78. 58 Cal. App. 3d 506, 130 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1976).
79. 40 Barb. 213 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1862).
80. The 1872 California Civil Code was based upon the civil code prepared in
1865 by David Dudley Field for the state of New York. Van Alstyne, Preface to CAL.
CwV. CODE 9 (West 1954); 2 D. FIELD, SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS
PAPERS (A. Sprague ed. 1884) reprinted in 10 CLASSICS n LEGAL HISTORY 482-83
(1972). Sections 1460 through 1467 of the California code dealing with covenants
were copied verbatim from sections 691 through 698 of the Field Code. Court de-
cisions from various jurisdictions were often appended to the code sections in order
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section 1468 was enacted.8' Although the statute was significantly
amended in 1968 and 1969, the amendments most likely will not be
applied retroactively,8 2 and therefore all covenants created before
1968 will be governed by the law as it existed at the time of their
creation.
The section as originally written provided: 8
A covenant made by the owner of land with the owner of other
land to do or refrain from doing some act on his own land, which
doing or refraining is expressed to be for the benefit of the land
of the covenantee, and which is made by the covenantor expressly
for his assigns or to the assigns of the covenantee, runs with both
of such parcels of land.
The section set up four requirements for the running of the covenant:
(1) the covenantor and covenantee must already be owners of land
at the time the covenant is made; any covenant contained in the grant
of an estate would be governed by section 1462,84 (2) the covenant
must concern some act on the covenantor's property, (3) the cove-
nant must be for the benefit of the land of the covenantee, and (4)
the covenant must state that it is for either the assigns of the cov-
enantor or the assigns of the covenantee.
The section provided that both the burden and the benefit would
run: the covenant was to run with "both such parcels of land."
For a covenant to run, however, the section established requirements
in addition to those found in section 1462. For example, under sec-
tion 1462 there is no requirement that the covenant expressly state
it is a benefit; the court may ascertain from the nature of the cove-
nant whether it is beneficial to the land.8 5 By contrast, under sec-
tion 1468 as enacted and as amended, the covenant must expressly
state that it is "for the benefit of the land of the covenantee." In
the absence of that express statement, one court held that a covenant
would not run under section 1468.80 Nonetheless, the court was
to provide examples and to "explain the reason and intent of the law." Preface to
ANN. CAL. Crv. CODE vi (C. Haymond & J. Burch ed. 1872).
81. 1905 Cal. Stats., ch. 450, § 1, at 610.
82. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n., 30 Cal. 2d 388, 393,
182 P.2d 159, 161 (1947): "It is an established canon of interpretation that statutes
are not to be given a retrospective operation unless it is clearly made to appear that
such was the legislative intent." Accord, Werner v. Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 183, 183
P. 945, 948 (1919).
83. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1468 (West 1954) (current version at CAL. Civ. CODE §
1468 (West Supp. 1977)).
84. Marra v. Aetna Constr. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 375, 377, 101 P.2d 490, 492 (1940).
85. See Pedro v. County of Humboldt, 217 Cal. 493, 496-97, 19 P.2d 776, 777
(1933); Sacramento Suburban Fruit Lands Co. v. Whaley, 50 Cal. App. 125, 133,
194 P. 1054, 1057 (1920).
86. Barbieri v. Ongaro, 208 Cal. App. 2d 753, 756, 25 Cal. Rptr. 471, 473 (1962).
apparently aware that it was making a technical distinction because
it declared an equitable servitude existed even though the criteria
for an equitable servitude had not been met.87 With little difficulty
the court could have determined whether the covenant was in fact
beneficial to the land of the covenantee, and if it was a benefit, the
court should not have allowed what appears to be a technical distinc-
tion to prevent the running of the covenant.
The original section also required that the covenant expressly
state it was made for the assigns of either the covenantor or the
covenantee. 8  No case has yet decided if the failure to make any
mention of assigns would prevent the running of either the benefit
or the burden under the 1905 version of section 1468. Although the
courts would probably insist on an express statement, it would be
preferable to follow the general rule that an intent the benefit run
can be determined from the nature and subject matter of the cove-
nant without any express words, although an intent that the burden
run should be explicitly indicated.89 Thus if a covenant under orig-
inal section 1468 fails to state expressly that it was made for the as-
signs of either the covenantor or covenantee, the benefit should none-
theless run, although the burden may not run.
Even though the benefit and burden would run under former
section 1468, the section as enacted was limited to covenants between
two landowners. Covenants most often occurred in grants of estates,
and under section 1462 the burden of a covenant did not run on the
grantee's land.90 The failure of the covenant to run was a harsh re-
sult for those who purchased land relying on the covenant to provide
certain restrictions."' Thus the courts held that even if the covenant
failed to run at law, the covenants could be enforced in equity against
a transferee who acquired property with notice of the restrictions.92
87. The agreement was not in the deed, no dominant tenement was described,
and the covenants were not expressed to be for the benefit of the other landowners.
Id. For a discussion of the criteria for equitable servitudes, see notes 116-39 & ac-
companying text infra.
88. The current statute requires that successive owners of the land involved be
expressly bound by the covenant. CAL. CiV. CODE § 1468 (West Supp. 1977). See
text accompanying notes 105-06 infra.
89. See notes 25-34 & accompanying text supra.
90. Marra v. Aetna Constr. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 375, 101 P.2d 490 (1940).
91. Covenants were most frequently used to impose desired building restrictions
in subdivision tracts. The most common provisions limited the tract to single family
residences and required the residences to be set back from the street a minimum dis-
tance. E.g., McBride v. Freeman, 191 Cal. 152, 215 P. 678 (1923); Werner v. Graham,
181 Cal. 174, 183 P. 945 (1919).
92. Marra v. Aetna Constr. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 375, 378, 101 P.2d 490, 492 (1940);
Ross v. Harootunian, 257 Cal. App. 2d 292, 294, 64 Cal. Rptr. 537, 538-39 (1967);
Aller v. Berkeley Hall School Found., 40 Cal. App. 2d 31, 37, 103 P.2d 1052, 1055
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The equitable enforcement of covenants, however, will most likely be
supplanted by the amended provisions of section 1468.
Amended Section 1468
In 1968 and again in 1969 the provisions of Civil Code section
1468 were expanded to cover not only covenants between two land-
owners but also covenants in grants of estates. As a result, -both the
benefits and burdens of covenants in grants of estates will run on
either the grantor or grantee's land under section 1468, unlike the
more limited provisions of section 1462. Amended section 1468 es-
tablishes several stringent requirements before a covenant will run.
Consequently, covenants created after 1968 that may not run under
amended section 1468 may still be enforceable under section 1462
or in equity.
The first amendment to section 1468 became effective November
13, 1968, and provided that covenants made by owners of land or
made by a grantor with the grantee would run with both the land
owned by the covenantor and the land of the covenantee if the cov-
enant were expressed to be for the benefit of the covenantee. 93 The
amendment added the provision that if the grantor imposed a burden
on his own property, the burden would run against his successors in
interest, and the benefit would run to the transferees of the grantee.
Whether a burden will run on the grantor's side under section 1462
is uncertain. This amendment to section 1468 was initiated by land
title associations so that if an owner of a shopping center promised
his grantees that he would not sell or lease other property in the
center to competing businesses, the promise could be enforced against
any subsequent grantee.94 The amendment was questioned for ar-
bitrarily distinguishing between the running of burdens on the gran-
tor's side and the running of burdens on the grantee's side,95 because
it provided for covenants made by the grantor but did not provide
for covenants made by the grantee. Thus the promise of the grantor
A to supply water was binding on A's transferee X, but the promise
(1940). Equitable enforcement of covenants is discussed in the text accompanying
notes 116-44 infra.
93. 1968 Cal. Stats., ch. 680, § 1, at 1377: "Each covenant, made by an owner
of land with the owner of other land or made by a grantor of land with the grantee
of land conveyed, to do or refrain from doing some act on his own land, which doing
or refraining is expressed to be for the benefit of the land of the covenantee, runs with
both the land owned by the covenantor and the land owned by or granted to the cov-
enantee and shall . . . benefit or be binding upon each successive owner, during his
ownership ......
94. Comment, Covenants: California's New Legislative Approach to Covenants
Running with the Land, 9 SA.-.A C.AR LAw. 285, 290-93 (1969).
95. Id. at 295.
of the grantee B to use the property only for a residence was not bind-
ing on B's transferee Y. Covenants imposing a burden on the trans-
feree of the grantee, however, have traditionally been enforced as
equitable servitudes, and to provide for the running of the burden
under section 1468 would change that large body of law.
Nonetheless, a second amendment was enacted, effective No-
vember 10, 1969, providing that covenants of the grantee would run
with the land and be binding on the transferees of the grantee-"6
After 1969 both the benefit and the burden run freely in covenants
either between landowners or between grantors and grantees if the
covenant is expressed to be for the benefit of the covenantee and if
the covenant meets the statutory requirements set out in subsections
(a) through (d). If the courts insist, however, on literal interpreta-
tions of those statutory requirements, covenants may still fail to run
because of technicalities.
96. 1969 Cal. Stats., ch. 245, § 1, at 594. The section as amended is substan-
tially what is found in the code today, CAL. CrV. CODE § 1468 (West Supp. 1977):
"Each covenant, made by an owner of land with the owner of other land or made
by a grantor of land with the grantee of land conveyed, or made by the grantee of
land conveyed with the grantor thereof, to do or refrain from doing some act on his
own land, which doing or refraining is expressed to be for the benefit of the land of
the covenantee, runs with both the land owned by or granted to the covenantor and
the land owned by or granted to the covenantee and shall, except as provided by Sec-
tion 1466, or as specifically provided in the instrument creating such covenant, and
notwithstanding the provisions of Section 1465, benefit or be binding upon each suc-
cessive owner, during his ownership, of any portion of such land affected thereby and
upon each person having any interest therein derived through any owner thereof where
all of the following requirements are met:
(a) The land of the covenantor which is to be affected by such covenants, and
the land of covenantee to be benefited, are particularly described in the instrument
containing such covenants;
(b) Such successive owners of the land are in such instrument expressed to be
bound thereby for the benefit of the land owned by, granted by, or granted to the
covenantee;
(c) Each such act relates to the use, repair, maintenance or improvement of, or
payment of taxes and assessments on, such land or some part thereof, or if the land
owned by or granted to each consists of undivided interests in the same parcel or
parcels, the suspension of the right of partition or sale in lieu of partition for a period
which is reasonable in relation to the purpose of the covenant;
(d) The instrument containing such covenants is recorded in the office of the
recorder of each county in which such land or some part thereof is situated.
Where several persons are subject to the burden of any such covenant, it shall
be apportioned among them pursuant to Section 1467, except that where only a portion
of such land is so affected thereby, such apportionment shall be only among the sev-
eral owners of such portion. This section shall apply to the mortgagee, trustee or ben-
eficiary of a mortgage or deed of trust upon such land or any part thereof while but
only while he, in such capacity, is in possession thereof."
The underlined passage indicates the amendment that was enacted in 1973. 1973 Cal.
Stats., ch. 474, § 1, at 948.
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The statutory requirements are as follows: (a) the lands to be
benefited and- burdened must be particularly described in the instru-
ment creating the covenant, either the deed between grantor and
grantee or the agreement between landowners, (b) the successors
of the covenantor must be expressly bound for the benefit of the land
of the covenantee, (c) the covenant must relate to the use, repair,
maintenance, or improvement of the property or the payment of taxes
and assessments; it may include an agreement between cotenants
not to seek partition, and (d) the agreement must be recorded.
The first two requirements, the description of the affected prop-
erty and the express statement that the covenant is for the benefit of
the covenantee, are apparent codifications of requirements that have
developed around equitable servitudes, and that law may thus be
used to asceftain the scope of the requirements under section 1468.
In the usual equitable servitude case,97 a landowner would sub-
divide his property and sell lots to individual owners. He would
impose a restriction on each lot that it be used only for residential
purposes, but because the restriction was a burden on the property,
it would not run as a covenant with the land under section 1462.
The court would enforce the restriction against a subsequent grantee
of the lot owner if the subsequent grantee took the land with notice
that it was restricted. As the subdivider issued the first deed with
the restrictions, he imposed a servitude upon the grantee's lot for
the benefit of the land he retained. As the subdivider sold each
additional lot the benefit and burden would pass as an incident. Thus
mutually enforceable resrictions were created, each lot burdened for
the benefit of all the other lots and each lot receiving the benefit
of the burdens on the other lots.98 If the first grantee received a
deed that declared her lot was restricted without stating who was
to receive the benefit of the restrictions, the courts reasoned that the
grantee might assume the restrictions ran in favor of the subdivider
only.9 9 The grantee might in fact be completely unaware that the
grantor owned other land. The grantee might be willing to accept
the burden of a restriction in favor of one person, whom she might
be able to persuade to release the restrictions at some future time,
although she might not be willing to accept the restrictions in favor
of twenty to a hundred other lot owners, any one of whom could
bring an action to enforce the restrictions. 100 Thus courts held that
before the covenant could be enforced by another lot owner, the land
97. See, e.g., Marra v. Aetna Constr. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 375, 101 P.2d 490 (1940);
Ross v. Harootunian, 257 Cal. App. 2d 292, 64 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1967).
98. Werner v. Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 183-85, 183 P. 945, 949 (1919).
99. Berryman v. Hotel Savoy Co., 160 Cal. 559, 564-65, 117 P. 677, 679 (1911).
100. McBride v. Freeman, 191 Cal. 152, 158-59, 215 P. 678, 681 (1923).
to be benefited had to be particularly described.' 0 ' The first require-
ment of 1468 apparently embraces that reasoning and policy.
If the grantee were truly surprised at the extent to which her
restrictions could be enforced by others, the court could appropri-
ately deny enforcement of the covenant because the grantee did not
have adequate notice. The court should not refuse to enforce the
covenant on the technical ground that the benefited property was
not sufficiently described. If the covenant were between two neigh-
boring landowners, the covenantor and her transferee in most circum-
stances would understand that the covenant was made for the bene-
fit of the neighbor's land only, although it might fail to describe par-
ticularly the adjoining property. In the case of a large subdivision,
most housing tracts have fairly demarcated boundaries. Determining
the extent of the tract would not be difficult. If there were any un-
certainty as to who could enforce the covenant, the courts could turn
to the law of easements for guidelines to determine the extent of a
burden that has not been specifically stated.
When an easement does not specifically define the burden im-
posed upon the servient tenement, it nonetheless entitles the ease-
ment holder to a use that is reasonably necessary and consistent with
the purpose for which the easement was granted. 0 2  The easement
is not declared void because the grant of the easement does not spec-
ify the extent of the burden. If a restrictive covenant were imposed
upon land and it was not clearly stated who could enforce it, the court
could determine what the restriction was intended to accomplish and
who should have the right to enforce it in order for the purpose to
be reasonably and consistently carried out. The courts should attempt
to effectuate the intent of the landowners' °3 to restrict their land to
particular uses rather than allow a transferee to escape the restriction
because the covenanting parties failed to describe sufficiently the
property to be benefited.
As the law of equitable servitudes has developed, the courts have
rigidly adhered to the requirement that the benefited property be
specifically described.10 4  If the courts continue that hardline ap-
101. Wing v. Forest Lawn Cemetery Ass'n, 15 Cal. 2d 472, 480, 101 P.2d 1099,
1103 (1940); Chandler v. Smith, 170 Cal. App. 2d 118, 120, 338 P.2d 522, 523-24
(1959).
102. City of Pasadena v. Californiar-Michigan Land & Water Co., 17 Cal. 2d 576,
582, 110 P.2d 983, 986 (1941).
103. Cf., Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, 7 Cal. 3d 473, 476, 498
P.2d 987, 989, 102 Cal. Rptr. 739, 741 (1972) (intent of grantor to reserve property
interest should take precedence over rigid common law rules).
104. Whether the grantees had actual knowledge made no difference. Werner
v. Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 185, 183 P. 945, 949 (1919); Martin v. Ray, 76 Cal. App.
2d 471, 478-79, 173 P.2d 573, 577-78 (1946).
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proach in interpreting requirement (a) of Civil Code section 1468,
covenants may fail to run even though all the parties had actual
notice of who had the right to enforce the covenant. The courts
should adopt a more flexible approach in order to accomplish the
intent of the parties to restrict their land. If a covenant is unclear
as to who has the right of enforcement, the courts can adopt guide-
lines analogous to those found in the law of easements that would
allow enforcement of the covenant to the extent reasonably necessary
and consistent with the purpose for which the covenant was created.
Subsection (b) of section 1468 requires that the covenant ex-
pressly state that the successive owners of the land of the covenantor
are bound for the benefit of the land of the covenantee. The suc-
cessors of the covenantor must be expressly bound in order to estab-
lish an intent that the burden run, although only the covenantee need
be mentioned in order for the benefit to run. Rather than reading
the subsection literally, that the successors of the covenantor must
be expressly mentioned, it would be preferable to understand the
subsection as embodying the general rule that no particular words or
terms are necessary so long as the court can find an intent that the
covenant run with the land;10 5 a statement simply that the covenant
runs with the land should be sufficient. To require that the assigns
of the covenantor be expressly named is to revert to that medieval
formalism which modem courts attempt to avoid.10 6
The third requirement, that the covenant relate to the use, re-
pair, maintenance, or improvement of the land, simply codifies the
kinds of promises found in the case law to concern real property.10
The provision that a covenant may provide for the payment of taxes
and assessments restates what is found in Civil Code section 1463.108
In 1973 an amendment was added to subsection (c) to include cov-
enants between cotenants not to partition the cotenancy. 10 9 Such
agreements were most likely valid even under section 1462.110
105. See note 26 & accompanying text supra.
106. See Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, 7 Cal. 3d 473, 476, 498 P.2d
987, 989, 102 CaL Rptr. 739, 741 (1972).
107. Richardson v. Callahan, 213 Cal. 683, 688, 3 P.2d 927, 929 (1931).
108. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1463 (West 1954): "Covenants which are for the direct
benefit of the property include: . . . covenants for the payment of rent, or of taxes
or assessments upon the land, on the part of a grantee."
109. 1973 Cal. Stats., ch. 474, § 1, at 948.
110. Section 1462 requires that the covenant be a benefit to the land. Whenever
there is a simultaneous interest in the land, such as in a lease or a cotenancy, the
covenant will be beneficial to one owner and therefore beneficial to the land, even
though it is a burden to other owners. Thus in a lease, the covenant to pay rent is
a benefit to the landlord and the leasehold estate, although it is a burden to the tenant.
The covenant not to partition a cotenancy is a benefit to the cotenants wo do not want
the land partitioned and thus a benefit to their undivided interest in the cotenancy,
The fourth requirement, that the deed or agreement be recorded,
is new to the law of covenants. The law is clear that the covenant
must be in writing,111 but California has no general requirement that
an instrument affecting property must be recorded in order to be
valid. Unrecorded instruments are valid as between the parties and
all subsequent purchasers taking with notice.112 If a transferee takes
an estate without actual inquiry, or constructive notice that the land
is subject to the burden of a covenant, he will not be held bound to
the covenant.113 If the transferee acquires an estate of a covenantor
with notice that the land is subject to a covenant, however, he should
not escape enforcement of the covenant on the technicality that it
is not recorded. Subsection (d) should be considered merely di-
rectory and not mandatory.
How strictly the requirements of subsections (a) through (d)
will be enforced remains to be seen. If the courts rigidly adhere to
the language of these subsections, the enforcement of covenants may
be defeated on a number of technical grounds: inadequate descrip-
tion of the benefited property, failure to state expressly that the as-
signs of the covenantor are bound, or simply a failure to have the
covenant recorded. The history of covenants in the first part of this
century has been one of strict construction and general judicial hos-
tility.114 The observation has been made, however, that through
zoning regulations, restrictions have been imposed on the use of land
that far exceed what has ever been attempted by private agree-
ments."' Zoning restrictions have long been accepted, and private
restrictions should now take their proper place in land use regula-
tions. The courts should construe the provisions of the statute liber-
ally in order to effectuate the intent of the covenanting parties to
restrict their land to certain uses.
Even if the courts require strict compliance and find that a cov-
enant does not run under section 1468, the covenant may still run
although it is a burden to a cotenant who does want partition. One California case
discussed a covenant not to partition the cotenancy but did not reach the issue whether
the covenant was a benefit. Harrison v. Domergue, 274 Cal. App. 2d 19, 78 Cal.
Rptr. 797 (1969).
111. Riley v. Bear Creek Planning Comm., 17 Cal. 3d 500, 551 P.2d 1213, 131
Cal. Rptr. 381 (1976); Murry v. Lovell, 132 Cal. App. 2d 30, 281 P.2d 316 (1955).
112. CAL. Cirv. CODE § 1217 (West 1954): "An unrecorded instrument is valid
as between the parties thereto and those who have notice thereof"; Merritt v. Rey, 104
Cal. App. 700, 707, 286 P. 510, 513 (1930).
113. See, e.g., Pollard v. Rebman, 162 Cal. 633, 124 P. 235 (1912).
114. Werner v. Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 181, 183 P. 945, 947 (1919). See Los
Angeles Terminal Land Co. v. Muir, 136 Cal. 36, 68 P. 308 (1902).
115. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as
Land Use Controls, 40 U. Cm. L. RFv. 681, 715-16 (1973).
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under section 1462. Section 1462 has only two requirements: that
the covenant be contained in a grant of an estate and that it be a
benefit to the land conveyed. There is no requirement for a descrip-
tion of the covenantee's land, for an express intent that the covenant
run, or for the covenant to be recorded. Under section 1462, both
the benefit and burden run if the covenant is for the benefit of the
land conveyed. If the covenant imposes a burden on the land of
the grantee, the burden does not run. A strong policy argument can
be made that even if the burden does not run on the grantee's land,
the benefit ought to run on the grantor's. If the covenant is both
a burden and a benefit, the burden runs with the benefit and is bind-
ing on a transferee. If a covenant is not enforceable under either
section 1462 or 1468, it may be enforceable in equity.
Equitable Servitudes
One of the first California cases to recognize the equitable en-
forcement of covenants quoted from Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence:
"[I]f the owner of land enters into a covenant concerning the land,
concerning its uses, subjecting it to easements or personal servi-
tudes and the like, and the land is afterwards conveyed or sold to
one who has notice of the covenants, the grantee or purchaser will
take the premises bound by the covenant, and will be .. .re-
strained from violating it; and it makes no difference whatever
with respect to this liability in equity whether the covenant is or
is not one which 'in law runs with the land.-,n1.
The basic concept is that when the covenant fails to run with the land
at law, the courts will enforce it against a transferee taking with no-
tice.' 17  Because the court is enforcing the covenant in equity, it may
grant enforcement in any case in which it would be inequitable to
permit the transferee to avoid the restrictions, and it may withhold
enforcement if it determines that a violation would not be injurious
to the covenantee's property. 118
Although equity may be applied if only two or a few landowners
are involved, the usual case has involved a subdivision with twenty
to a hundred or more lot owners." 9 Typically, because a subdivider
116. Hunt v. Jones, 149 Cal. 297, 301, 86 P. 686, 688 (1906) (quoting 2 J.
POMEROY, EQurrY JURISPRUDENCE § 689 (1886)).
117. Marra v. Aetna Constr. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 375, 378, 101 P.2d 490, 492 (1940).
118. Id.; Los Angeles Terminal Land Co. v. Muir, 136 Cal. 36, 45-46, 68 P. 308,
311 (1902); Guaranty Realty Co. v. Recreation Gun Club, 12 Cal. App. 383, 388, 107
P. 625, 627 (1910).
119. Marra v. Aetna Constr. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 375, 378, 101 P.2d 490, 492 (1940);
Werner v. Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 183 P. 945 (1919) (involved 132 lot subdivision,
of which 116 had been sold).
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wanted to restrict his tract to single family use, he inserted in the
deed to each lot in the tract a promise that the lot owner would
construct only a single family residence. Because the restriction im-
posed a burden on the land of the grantee, it would not run with
the land under Civil Code section 1462, but the courts were willing
to enforce the restriction in equity.' 20
In the unique circumstances of subdivisions, the courts devel-
oped the doctrine of mutual equitable servitudes, reasoning that the
lot owners had entered into a mutual agreement that each owner
would restrict her land for the benefit of all the other owners in the
tract.121 When the subdivider sold the first parcel, the lot owner
promised to restrict her land for the benefit of the land the subdivider
retained, and the subdivider promised to restrict his remaining land
for the benefit of the first parcel. Based upon that first conveyance,
mutual equitable servitudes sprang into existence: both the land of
the lot owner and the remaining land of the subdivider became a
servient tenement in favor of the other's dominant tenement. As the
subdivider sold each additional lot, the burden and benefit of the
mutual promises passed as an incident to the subsequently conveyed
land. The second parcel conveyed was burdened by the subdivider's
promise and benefited by the restriction on the first parcel and the
restrictions on the subdivider's remaining land.
Following this analytical model, the courts concluded that both
the subdivider and the first lot owner must agree to enter into this
mutually binding agreement. The intention of the subdivider alone
to impose a servitude on his development is not sufficient.' 2 2 The
courts also stated that the only place the parties could express their
intent was in the deed, which was the final memorial of their agree-
ment.123  Thus the courts began to veer away from the basic equi-
table concept that covenants would be enforced against all those
purchasers taking with notice and began constructing a set of rules
as rigid and technical as those found in the enforcement of covenants
running at law. In one case the subdivider read the restrictions to
all the lot owners individually so that they all had actual notice and
presumably had agreed to the restrictions because they subsequently
bought the property. 24  The court held, nonetheless, that because
the restrictions were not in the deeds, they were not enforceable.
The entire set of restrictions does not have to be set out in each
120. Ross v. Harootunian, 257 Cal. App. 2d 292, 294, 64 Cal. Rptr. 537, 538 (1967).
121. Werner v. Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 183-85, 183 P. 945, 949 (1919).
122. Id. at 184; Orinda Homeowner's Comm. v. Board of Supervisors, 11 Cal. App.
3d 768, 777, 90 Cal. Rptr. 88, 93 (1970).
123. 181 Cal. 174, 185, 183 P. 945, 949 (1919).
124. Murry v. Lovell. 132 Cal. App. 2d 30, 281 P.2d 316 (1955).
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deed. The subdivider can file a declaration of restrictions that will
serve as record notice.12' The mere filing of the declaration, how-
ever, is only a manifestation of the subdivider's intent to impose re-
strictions and does not manifest the joint intent of the subdivider and
the lot owners. The subdivider must insert the agreement in at least
one of the deeds in order to legally establish that he and the lot owner
agree to be bound by the restrictions on file. 126
If the subdivider fails to insert the agreement in the first deed
but remembers to insert it in the fifth deed, for example, the equi-
table servitude springs into existence from deed five onwards. 27  The
restrictions do not apply to the first four lots because the subdivider
no longer has any interest in those lots and cannot place a restriction
on them in favor of the rest of the tract. If the subdivider inserts
the agreement in deeds five and six and then fails again to put them
in seven and eight, the courts have held that lot owners five and six
can enforce the restrictions against seven and eight, but seven and
eight cannot enforce them against each other.12  When the subdi-
vider put the agreement in the deeds to lots five and six, he agreed
to burden the rest of the unsold subdivision. When he sold lots seven
and eight, the burden of his agreement passed as an incident to lots
seven and eight in favor of lots five and six. 129  There was no agree-
ment between lot owner seven and the subdivider that the subdivider
burden the rest of his tract in favor of lot seven. Thus when the
subdivider conveyed lot eight, there was no burden to pass incident
to the land in favor of lot seven. Lot seven can enforce the restric-
tions against lots five and six, however, because just as the burden
of the agreement between the subdivider and five and six passed as
an incident to lot seven, so should the benefit of that agreement pass.
The subdivider had the benefit of enforcing the restrictions against
five and six, and that benefit passes to seven.
If the subdivider resumes placing the agreements in the deeds
to lots nine and ten, lot owners seven and eight cannot enforce the
restrictions against nine and ten, and similarly nine and ten cannot
enforce them against seven and eight. When the subdivider con-
veyed nine and ten, he no longer had any interest in seven and eight.
125. Trahrms v. Starrett, 34 Cal. App. 3d 766, 771, 110 Cal. Rptr. 239, 241-42
(1973).
126. Girard v. Miller, 214 Cal. App. 2d 266, 275, 29 Cal. Rptr. 359, 364 (1963).
127. See Riley v. Bear Creek Planning Comm., 17 Cal. 3d 500, 506-07, 551 P.2d
1213, 1217-18, 131 Cal. Rptr. 381, 386 (1976).
128. See Trahms v. Starrett, 34 Cal. App. 3d 766, 110 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1973).
129. Riley v. Bear Creek Planning Comm., 17 Cal. 3d 500, 506, 551 P.2d 1213,
1218, 131 Cal. Rptr. 381, 386 (1976), (quoting Werner v. Graham, 181 Cal. 174,
183-85, 183 P. 945, 949 (1919)).
He could neither impose a restriction on them in favor of anyone
else nor confer a benefit on them.13 0
The foregoing analysis of lots five through ten may be logical,
but is it equitable? If lot owner eight had actual or constructive
knowledge of the restrictions, the court should allow lot owner seven
to enforce them. Lot owner eight took her land with notice, and
her conscience should be bound.13 '
From the basic premise that the lot owner must agree with the
subdivider to the mutually enforceable servitude, there have evolved
a number of other rules. The agreement must expressly state that
the restrictions are for the benefit of all the other lot owners in the
tract and must particularly describe the tract.132  If the subdivider
fails to state that the restrictions are for the benefit of other lot own-
ers, the court will assume that the restrictions are for the personal
benefit of the subdivider.' 3 3  If the subdivider fails to describe the
dominant tenement, the lot owner is held not to have had adequate
notice that his restrictions can be enforced by others; the lot owner
is assumed to have thought that the restrictions ran in favor of the
subdivider only.13 There may have been a particular case in which
a lot owner truly did not know that the restrictions on his land could
be enforced by someone other than the subdivider. In such a case
the court could have found it inequitable to allow another lot owner
to enforce the restriction.
The requirements that the dominant tenement be described, and
the express statement that the other lot owners are benefited, have
unfortunately become inflexible rules that have defeated the enforce-
ment of what should be valid servitudes. The courts have lost sight
of the basic principle that they are enforcing covenants in equity that
have failed to run at law.
One additional rule that has caused problems is that the restric-
tions must be pursuant to a uniform plan. 135 Because the lot owners
are entering into mutually enforceable servitudes, each lot owner
should have the right to enforce the same restrictions against every
other lot owner. As one court said, it would be inequitable to en-
130. Id. at 507, 551 P.2d at 1219, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
131. Bryan v. Grosse, 155 Cal. 132, 135, 99 P. 499, 500 (1909).
132. King v. Snyder, 189 Cal. App. 2d 482, 11 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1961); Chandler
v. Smith, 170 Cal. App. 2d 118, 338 P.2d 522 (1959). See note 101 & accompanying
text supra.
133. McBride v. Freeman, 191 Cal. 152, 158-59, 215 P. 678, 681 (1923); Berryman
v. Hotel Savoy Co., 160 Cal. 559, 564-65, 117 P. 677, 679 (1911).
134. Berryman v. Hotel Savoy Co., 160 Cal. 559, 564-65, 117 P. 667, 679 (1911);
Chandler v. Smith, 170 Cal. App. 2d 118, 338 P.2d 522 (1959).
135. Moe v. Gier, 116 Cal. App. 403, 409, 2 P.2d 852, 854-55 (1931).
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force the restrictions if there were no general scheme. 136 One lot
owner might acquire a benefit that was denied the other lot owners.
All of the restrictions do not have to be exactly alike, however, and
some variation is allowed. 13 7
A general scheme can be established by a reference in the deed
to a subdivision map.38 From the map the court can determine such
things as uniform setback lines and uniform lot sizes. There does
not have to be any particular document or statement that the sub-
divider is following a uniform plan. All that is necessary is a suffi-
cient uniformity in the development to indicate unmistakably that a
designated plan is being followed. 139
From the basic principle that covenants will be enforced in equi-
ty, the courts have erected a superstructure of rules and doctrines
in dealing with subdivision restrictions. They have set up four main
requirements for enforcing the restrictions: (1) the subdivider and
his lot owners must intend to enter into mutually enforceable restric-
tions and must state that intention in the deeds to the lots, (2) the
restrictions must be pursuant to a general scheme, (3) the restrictions
must expressly state that they are for the benefit of all the other lots
in the tract, and (4) the dominant and servient tenements must be
shown.140 These rules may be appropriate in dealing with large sub-
divisions in order to ensure that the lot owners have adequate notice
of who has the right to enforce the covenants and that the burden
and benefits are uniformly distributed. The rules, however, should
be considered, at the very most, only as guidelines to help the court
in deciding when to exercise its equitable powers.' 41  They should
not become roadblocks that prevent equitable enforcement. The
fundamental principle is that the court is enforcing a covenant which
has failed to run at law in a case in which the court believes it would
be inequitable to allow the transferee of the land to avoid the restric-
tion.142  Other jurisdictions recognize the inequity of allowing a sub-
136. Id. at 411, 2 P.2d at 855.
137. Collani v. White, 38 Cal. App. 2d 539, 544, 101 P.2d 767, 769 (1940); see
Miles v. Clark, 44 Cal. App. 539, 187 P. 167 (1919).
138. Moore v. Ojai Improvement Co., 152 Cal. App. 2d 124, 130, 313 P.2d 47, 51
(1957).
139. Moe v. Gier, 116 Cal. App. 403, 409, 2 P.2d 852, (1931) (however, restric-
tions must be in the deed).
140. Trahms v. Starrett, 34 Cal. App. 3d 766, 770-71, 110 Cal. Rptr. 239, 241
(1973).
141. The court in Werner v. Graham, however, took a very strict view and held
that it was not a question of applying its equitable powers; the restrictions did not in
fact exist. 181 Cal. 174, 186, 183 P. 945, 950 (1919). The court's reasoning is circu-
lar: equitable servitudes did not exist because the court refused to invoke its equity
powers.
142. Marra v. Aetna Constr. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 375, 378, 101 P.2d 490, 492 (1940).
divider to represent orally that a tract is restricted and then permit-
ting him to profit by selling part of the tract for commercial use.
1 3
Those jurisdictions are willing to use equitable enforcement against
the subdivider or his successors taking with notice, even though there
has been no written document outlining the restrictions.
The argument for applying this superstructure of rules is even
weaker if the court is dealing, not with a subdivision but with a cov-
enant between two landowners. If one of the landowners has trans-
ferred her property to a purchaser taking with notice, the requirement
of a description of the dominant tenement or an express statement
that the covenant is for the benefit of the neighbor seems unnecessary.
The covenanting parties and their transferees can determine from the
circumstances surrounding the covenant whom the covenant is in-
tended to benefit. If there is any ambiguity or disagreement about
the extent to which the covenant should be enforced, the court can
borrow the rule applicable to easements and hold that the burden
of the covenant will extend only as far as is reasonably necessary or
to the extent to which the parties have previously acquiesced or con-
sented.144  The court should have no hesitance in enforcing the cov-
enant if the transferee has taken the land with notice and if it would
be inequitable to permit him to avoid the burden.
Section 1468 and Equitable Servitudes
For subdivision restrictions that have been created after 1969
the courts should no longer need to resort to equitable servitudes.
The burden of a covenant imposed on a grantee of land will run with
the land under Civil Code section 1468.145 When the subdivider
puts a restriction in the deed to the lot he sells, that restriction will
now run at law.
Section 1468, however, sets up requirements that parallel the
doctrines developed for equitable servitudes: the land benefited
must be particularly described and the covenant must be expressed
to be for the benefit of the covenantee. 146  Both of these require-
ments are desirable in ensuring that a transferee in a subdivision will
know exactly who has the right to enforce the restrictions on his land.
If the subdivider fails to comply with these requirements under sec-
tion 1468 but the transferee has taken with adequate notice, the courts
143. POWELL, supra note 11, at If 672, and authorities cited therein.
144. City of Pasadena v. California-Michigan Land & Water Co., 17 Cal. 2d 576,
582, 110 P.2d 983, 986 (1941); Winslow v. City of Vallejo, 148 Cal. 723, 725, 84 P.
191, 192 (1906).
145. See notes 93-96 & accompanying text supra.
146. See notes 96-106 & accompanying text supra.
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should be willing to step in and enforce the covenant either on the
grounds that there has been substantial, though not literal compliance
with the requirements of section 1468 or that equity will enforce the
covenant if the covenant is insufficient to run at law. Because the
burden of covenants can now be enforced at law, the courts have an
opportunity to reconsider what should be the proper function of its
equitable enforcement powers. The courts should return to the basic
premise set out in Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, that equity will
enforce a covenant against one who has taken with notice.147 No
other set of rules or doctrines need be encrusted on this basic
principle.
Construction, Enforcement, and Termination
Whether a covenant runs with the land at law or in equity, a
number of factors may facilitate or prevent the covenant's enforce-
ment. The courts must sometimes interpret whether they are in fact
dealing with a covenant or some other property interest, such as an
easement or condition subsequent. Because both Civil Code sections
1462 and 1468 require that the covenant benefit the land, the court
must determine what is considered beneficial. " Finally, the covenant
may no longer be enforceable because of a change in the surrounding
community or because of the actions of the parties.
Construction
If A wanted to convey part of his land to B but wanted to ensure
that B used it only for residential purposes, he could accomplish his
goal in a number of ways. He could convey to B a fee simple de-
terminable or a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent, or he
could extract from B a promise. If the language in the deed stated
that A conveyed to B only so long as B used the property for resi-
dential purposes, A would have created a fee simple determinable,
and when B ceased to use the property for a residence, the land would
automatically revert to A.'14  If the deed stated that A conveyed to
B, provided that, or upon condition that, the land be used only for
a residence, A would have created an estate subject to a condition
subsequent, and when B failed to use the property as a residence, A
would have the power to terminate the estate.' 49 If the deed merely
stated that B agreed to use the property for a residence, the deed
would only have created a covenant, and B would not lose his estate
147. 2 J. PormmoY, EQurry JuRIsPtumcE § 689 (1886).
148. 2 PowEL.L, supra note 11, at IT 187.
149. Id. at g 188; Rosecrans v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co. 21 Cal. 2d 602, 605, 134 P.2d
245, 246 (1943).
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if he failed to maintain a residence, 150 but A could get an injunction
to prevent him from using it for any other purpose.' 5 '
Because special limitations and conditions subsequent can lead
to a forfeiture, the courts will construe such estates to be covenants
if such a construction is at all possible.' 5 2 If the intent of the grantor
to create a condition subsequent is clear and unmistakable, however,
the courts will enforce a forfeiture. Language such as "provided,"
"upon express condition that," and "however," has been held suffi-
cient to create a condition subsequent, as well as the simple statement
that the grantor retains a right of re-entry or power of termination. 53
Language that stated the land was conveyed for railroad purposes
was held to have been a limitation upon the estate, sufficient to create
a condition subsequent.1 4  Language that sounds in promise, how-
ever, will be construed as a covenant. For example, a promise to
build a road constitutes a covenant and does not confer a road ease-
ment.155
Once the language is construed as creating a covenant, the court
may have to interpret the covenant's meaning. Traditionally, there
has been a strong judicial policy in favor of the free use of land, and
any ambiguity or doubt has been resolved against the covenant's en-
forcement.156 More recently some courts have expressed a greater
willingness to construe the deeds so as to accomplish the intent of
the parties. 157 The deed may be interpreted in the light of surround-
ing circumstances, and extrinsic evidence may be admitted to estab-
lish the intent of the parties, although evidence cannot be admitted
to vary the terms of the covenant.' 58 The words of the covenant
should be understood in their common meaning, unless they are used
in a technical sense.' 59 The terms of the covenant must be clearly
150. Hawley v. Kafitz, 148 Cal. 393, 83 P. 248 (1905).
151. Joyce v. Krupp, 83 Cal. App. 391, 398, 257 P. 124, 127 (1927).
152. Rosecrans v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 21 Cal. 2d 602, 605, 134 P.2d 245, 246
(1943); Boughton v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 231 Cal. App. 2d 188, 194, 41 Cal. Rptr.
714, 717 (1964).
153. Rosecrans v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 21 Cal. 2d 602, 605, 134 P.2d 245, 246-47
(1943); Hawley v. Kafitz, 148 Cal. 393, 395, 83 P. 248, 249 (1905).
154. Pavkovich v. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 150 Cal. 39, 87 P. 1097 (1906).
155. Marin County Hosp. Dist. v. Cicurel, 154 Cal. App. 2d 294, 298-99, 316 P.2d
32, 36 (1957).
156. Wing v. Forest Lawn Cemetery Ass'n, 15 Cal. 2d 472, 479, 101 P.2d 1099,
1103 (1940); Werner v. Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 181, 183 P. 945, 947 (1919).
157. Hannula v. Hacienda Homes, 34 Cal. 2d 442, 444, 211 P.2d 302, 304 (1949);
Biagini v. Hyde, 3 Cal. App. 3d 877, 880, 83 Cal. Rptr. 875, 877 (1970).
158. Moss Dev. Co. v. Geary, 41 Cal. App. 3d 1, 9-13, 115 Cal. Rptr. 736, 741-44
(1974); Bramwell v. Kuhle, 183 Cal. App. 2d 767, 776-77, 6 Cal. Rptr. 839, 845
(1960).
159. Moss Dev. Co. v. Geary, 41 Cal. App. 3d 1, 9, 115 Cal. Rptr. 736, 741 (1974);
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expressed, however, because the courts will not read restrictions into
the agreement by implication.160  0
The court may have to construe the extent to which the original
parties intended a covenant to run. Under Civil Code section 1468,
of course, the covenant must expressly state that it is for the bdnefit
of the land of the covenantee and that it is binding on the successive
owners. 1 1 By contrast, under section 1462, no special words are
necessary. 10 2 Nonetheless, even under 1462, if the parties fail to show
an intent that the covenant run, the covenant will be considered per-
sonal to them.0 3 Even if the covenant is clearly expressed to run
with the land, the court may find the parties only intended the cove-
nant to run as long as it accomplished a certain purpose.
In Harrison v. Domergue, 64 a number of cotenants had agreed
to offer each other the right of first refusal before seeking any parti-
tion of the land held in common. All of the original cotenants had
died, and the present cotenants were the successors in interest. One
of the successor cotenants brought a partition suit, and the remaining
successor cotenants argued that he had to offer them the right of
first refusal. The court found that the intention of the original parties
was to control who might become their cotenants, but because there
were no longer any original cotenants, the intent and purpose of the
covenant had ceased, and the covenant did not run beyond the life
of the last original cotenant.165
Types of Restrictions and Benefits
Restrictions that are considered unreasonable or that violate the
policy of the law will not be upheld. 66 For a number of years the
courts were willing to enforce racial restrictions, 67 but the United.
States Supreme Court held in 1948 that enforcement of such restric-
tions by the courts was state action in violation of the equal protec-
tion guarantee of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Con-
stitution.0 8  Subsequently, California statutes were enacted which
King v. Kugler, 197 Cal. App. 2d 651, 655, 17 Cal. Rptr. 504, 507 (1961); Harrison
v. Frye, 148 Cal. App. 2d 626, 628, 307 P.2d 76, 77 (1957).
160. Hannula v. Hacienda Homes, 34 Cal. 2d 442, 444, 211 P.2d 302, 304 (1949).
161. See note 105 & accompanying text supra.
162. See note 22 & accompanying text supra.
163. Heimburge v. State Guar. Corp., 116 Cal. App. 380, 383, 2 P.2d 998, 999
(1931).
164. 274 Cal. App. 2d 19, 78 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1969).
165. Id. at 22-23, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 799.
166. Los Angeles Terminal Land Co. v. Muir, 136 Cal. 36, 42, 68 P. 308, 310
(1902); Walker v. Haslett, 44 Cal. App. 394, 397-98, 186 P. 622, 623 (1919).
167. E.g., Wayt v. Patee, 205 Cal. 46, 269 P. 660 (1928).
168. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (court cannot enforce covenant by
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void any provision in a written instrument that purports to forbid or
restrict the use of real property on the basis of sex, race, or religion. 16 9
The California courts have most often had to consider what is
an unreasonable covenant in the area of restrictions on competition.
The covenant may restrict the use of land from a particular business,
and such a provision is a separate issue from restricting the person.170
The restriction will be upheld if it does not create a monopoly or
amount to an unreasonable restraint on competition. 171 In one case,
a grocery store owner moved his business several blocks from his old
building, which he sold. The court found that it was not unreason-
able to want to prevent another grocery store from operating in the
same neighborhood and thus to restrict the old property from grocery
store use.17
2
Because the covenant must be for the benefit of the land of the
covenantee, the court may have to determine what is a benefit. The
promise need not physically benefit the land. Any covenant that
affects the title or any interest in the estate of the covenantee may
be beneficial.' 73 A covenant providing for the removal of a lien is
for the unfettering of title and is for the direct benefit of the land.17 4
A covenant to quitclaim oil rights restores those rights to the land-
owner and is for the benefit of the land.17 5  An agreement between
adjoining landowners to share any litigation expense to protect water
rights is a benefit.176  Promises to take out insurance, to repair, to
renew a lease, and to develop mineral resources are all considered
beneficial to the property and are covenants running with the land.17 7
Prior to 1969 the rule was that a burden would not run on the
grantee's land and that therefore the covenant was unenforceable
against the successor to the grantee, even if the covenant was a ben-
injunction); Barrows v. Jackson, 112 Cal. App. 2d 534, 247 P.2d 99 (1952), aff'd,
346 U.S. 249 (1953) (court cannot award money damages).
169. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 53, 782 (West Supp. 1977).
170. Boughton v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 231 Cal. App. 2d 188, 190, 41 Cal. Rptr.
714, 715 (1964).
171. Id.; Doo v. Packwood, 265 Cal. App. 2d 752, 756, 71 Cal. Rptr. 477, 480
(1968).
172. Doo v. Packwood, 265 Cal. App. 2d 752, 71 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1968).
173. See Carlson v. Lindauer, 119 Cal. App. 2d 292, 304-05, 259 P.2d 925, 931
(1953); Sacramento Suburban Fruit Lands Co. v. Whaley, 50 Cal. App. 125, 130, 194
P. 1054, 1056 (1920).
174. Sacramento Suburban Fruit Lands Co. v. Whaley, 50 Cal. App. 125, 130, 194
P. 1054, 1056 (1920).
175. Carlson v. Lindauer, 119 Cal. App. 2d 292, 304-05, 259 P.2d 925, 931-32
(1953).
176. See Miller & Lux, Inc. v. San Joaquin Agricultural Co., 58 Cal. App. 753,
755, 209 P. 592, 592-93 (1922).
177. Richardson v. Callahan, 213 Cal. 683, 688, 3 P.2d 927, 929 (1931).
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efit to the grantbr. A promise to run a railroad did not benefit the
land on which the railroad ran but rather the grantor's retained land,
and therefore was not a covenant that ran with the land against the
successor in interest to the railroad. 17
After the 1969 amendment to section 1468, however, a burden
will run on the grantee's land if the grantee's promise is a benefit
to the land of the grantor-covenantee. Under amended section 1468,
the successor to the railroad would have had to continue running
trains on the land conveyed to it because the promise to run the
trains was a benefit to the land of the grantor-covenantee.
Enforcement
If a landowner is entitled to the benefit of a covenant, he may
either bring an action for damages or seek an injunction against the
one who has the burden of the covenant and is in violation.179  If
money damages are sought, actual damage must be shown.180 If an
injunction is sought, a complainant need only show that the cove-
nantor is violating the covenant in order for an injunction to issue.' 8 '
The courts will not question the wisdom of a particular covenant,
so long as the covenant does not violate public policy. 8 2 An owner
of land may extract from his covenantee such covenants as he pleases,
touching and concerning the land, and he has a right to define what
constitutes an injury to him. 83 The right is not absolute, however,
because the courts will not deal with trifles. If the violation is
innocent, the injury is slight, and the cost of rectification would be
disproportionate to the loss, the court may decline enforcement.'8s
The disproportion of redress to injury, however, is not the test; the
court may require correction if there is injury to the plaintiff and will
certainly require correction if the defendant knowingly violated the
covenant. 8 5
Both damages and an injunction may be awarded: damages
178. Lyford v. North Pae. Coast R.R. Co., 92 Cal. 93, 28 P. 103 (1891).
179. Alderson v. Cutting, 163 Cal. 503, 506, 126 P. 157, 158 (1912); Doo v. Pack-
wood, 265 Cal. App. 2d 752, 756, 71 Cal. Rptr. 477, 480-81 (1968).
180. See Joyce v. Krupp, 83 Cal. App. 391, 398-99, 257 P. 124, 127 (1927);
Alderson v. Cutting, 163 Cal. 503, 506, 126 P. 157, (1912); see also Doo v. Packwood,
265 Cal. App. 2d 752, 758, 71 Cal. Rptr. 477, 481-82 (1968).
181. See Doo v. Packwood, 265 Cal. App. 2d 752, 756, 71 Cal. Rptr. 477, 480
(1968); Joyce v. Krupp, 83 Cal. App. 391, 398, 257 P. 124, 127 (1927); Walker v.
Haslett, 44 Cal. App. 394, 398, 186 P. 622, 623 (1919).
182. See Walker v. Haslett, 44 Cal. App. 394, 397-98, 186 P. 622, 623 (1919).
183. Id.
184. Morgan v. Veach, 59 Cal. App. 2d 682, 690, 139 P.2d 976, 980 (1943).
185. Id.
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for the actual injury from the beginning of the violation until the
issuance of the injunction and the injunction to prevent further dam-
age.18 6
The party who is burdened with a covenant may bring an action
to test its validity in either a suit for declaratory relief or a suit to
quiet title. 18 7  A declaratory relief action asking the court to construe
restrictions may result, however, in some restrictions being found
unenforceable while others remain. The action is not the same as
one to quiet title.188
Generally, one is entitled to enforce a covenant only so long as
he owns land benefited. Civil Code sections 1462 and 1468 require
that the covenant be a direct benefit to "the property" or the "land
of the covenantee." Once a landowner has conveyed all his land to
a subsequent grantee, he is no longer personally entitled to the ben-
efit of the covenant and may not bring an action to enforce it.s9
If a party is seeking to enforce an equitable servitude, he must pos-
sess a dominant tenement. 90 A power of termination has been held
not to constitute a sufficient interest in land to allow the holder of
the power to enforce a restriction if he owns no other property in the
area.' 9 ' The retention of a parking lot has also been held an insuffi-
cient interest because the parking lot was not benefiting from the
residential use restrictions. 192
A power of termination together with utility easements, how-
ever, has been held to constitute a sufficient interest to enable the
holder to defend against an attempt by one of the lot owners to have
the restrictions declared void.193  This result would seem to be de-
sirable, if not entirely consistent. Although the holder may not have
sufficient interest to enforce the restrictions, he is considered to have
enough interest to defend them in a declaratory action.
A subdivider may establish a committee or homeowners associ-
tion to oversee the enforcement of the restrictions. Often the com-
mittee is given an active role in approving or disapproving building
plans.19 If the subdivider appoints a committee composed of mem-
186. Doo v. Packwood, 265 Cal. App. 2d 752, 756, 71 Cal. Rptr. 477, 480 (1968).
187. Marra v. Aetna Constr. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 375, 377, 101 P.2d 490, 492 (1940).
188. Forman v. Hancock, 3 Cal. App. 2d 291, 39 P.2d 249 (1934).
189. See Firth v. Marovich, 160 Cal. 257, 260, 116 P. 729, 731 (1911).
190. Marra v. Aetna Constr. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 375, 378, 101 P.2d 490, 492 (1940).
191. Blodgett v. Trumbull, 83 Cal. App. 566, 571-72, 257 P. 199, 201 (1927).
192. Kent v. Koch, 166 Cal. App. 2d 579, 586, 333 P.2d 411, 415 (1958).
193. Shields v. Bank of America, 225 Cal. App. 2d 330, 334, 37 Cal. Rptr. 360, 363
(1964).
194. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Riviera Estates Ass'n, 7 Cal. App. 3d 449, 87
Cal. Rptr. 150 (1970); Bramwell v. Kuhle, 183 Cal. App. 2d 767, 6 Cal. Rptr. 839
(1960).
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bers who do not own land in the subdivision, the committee can en-
force the restrictions so long as the subdivider retains property in
the tract; the subdivider has simply assigned his right of enforcement
to a committee of his own choosing.195 Once the subdivider has
sold all of his interest, it does not necessarily follow that the com-
mittee no longer has any power of enforcement. As one court said,
the committee is acting on behalf of the lot owners in the tract.196
The lot owners had the power to elect their own committee, but the
court decided that the owners should have a right to continuation
of the committee's function until a new committee was elected. To
have decided otherwise would have left a period of time when no
enforcing body was in existence to approve the plans, during which
time any kind of construction could have proceeded.
A homeowners association will most likely be composed of lot
owners in the tract, but the association may not own any land in the
subdivision. If the association seeks to enforce the tract restrictions
in its own name, the question is raised as to what right the associa-
tion has to bring the action. The California courts have held that
the association has a duty to protect the interests of its members. 197
Other jurisdictions have looked beyond the association and held that
because the members as landowners had a right to enforce the re-
strictions, an action by the association was simply a covenient way
of enforcing a common right.198
The extent of the committee or association's power will be lim-
ited by the rights and restrictions set out in the deeds. The restric-
tions cannot be added to or expanded by implication.199 The court
will not hamstring effective enforcement, however, by adhering to a
literal understanding of the scope of the restrictions; a right to ap-
prove building plans includes the right to determine that a severed
portion of an original lot is too small for the type of dwellings found
in the tract.2 00 Any determination by the association must be in
good faith. Its power can not be exercised capriciously or arbi-
trarily.20'
When two parties enter into a covenant, they have in effect en-
tered into a contract respecting the use of land. Even after the
original covenantor has parted with the land, he can be held liable
195. Bramwell v. Kuhle, 183 Cal. App. 2d 767, 774, 6 Cal. Rptr. 839, 844 (1960).
196. Weston v. Foreman, 108 Cal. App. 2d 686, 693, 239 P.2d 513, 517 (1952).
197. Id. at 692, 239 P.2d at 517; Russell v. Palos Verdes Properties, 218 Cal. App.
2d 754, 765, 32 Cal. Rptr. 488, 495 (1963).
198. Pow=xJ, supra note 11, ff 681.
199. Hannula v. Hacienda Homes, Inc., 34 Cal. 2d 442, 211 P.2d 302 (1949);
Lushing v. Riviera Estates Ass'n, 196 Cal. App. 2d 687, 16 Cal. Rptr. 763 (1961).
200. Hannula v. Hacienda Homes, Inc., 34 Cal. 2d 442, 211 P.2d 302 (1949).
201. Bramwell v. Kuhle, 183 Cal. App. 2d 767, 779, 6 Cal. Rptr. 839, 847 (1960).
in contract for a breach of the covenant by his transferees. 20 2  The
transferees of the original covenantor, on the other hand, are only
bound by the covenant through their ownership of the land. The
transferees did not personally enter into any contract with the cov-
enantee and are bound only because the covenant runs with the
ownership of the land. Consequently, a transferee is only liable for
the breach of a covenant that occurs during his ownership and is
not liable for any breaches that occurred before he acquired the land
or after he has parted with it.20 3
If a particular parcel of land is subject to the burden of a cov-
enant and the parcel is later broken up into several smaller parcels,
Civil Code section 1467 requires the burden be apportioned among
the new owners according to the value of each parcel. If the value
cannot be determined, the burden will be apportioned according to
the relative size of each parcel.204
If an owner has a particular interest in land, such as a fee simple
or a life estate, Civil Code section 1465 requires that a transferee ac-
quire the same interest before he can be bound by any covenant
running with the land.20 5 Although the section would seem to apply
only to the running of burdens, the courts have interpreted it to in-
clude both burdens and benefits.20 6  A transferee must acquire the
same interest before he can be subject to a burden or receive the
benefit of a covenant running with the land. Thus the grant of a
road easement or a leasehold estate from one holding a fee does not
transfer either the burden or the benefit of any covenant to the ease-
ment holder or lessee. 20 7  Section 1465 is limited, however, to cov-
enants running under Civil Code section 1462 and the 1905 provisions
202. Grange Co. v. Simmons, 203 Cal. App. 2d 567, 21 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1962);
California Packing Corp. v. Grove, 51 Cal. App. 253, 196 P. 891 (1921).
203. Miller & Lux, Inc. v. San Joaquin Agricultural Co., 58 Cal. App. 753, 209 P.
592 (1922); CAL. Civ. CODE § 1466 (West 1954): "No one, merely by reason of
having acquired an estate subject to a covenant running with the land, is liable for a
breach of the covenant before he acquired the estate, or after he has parted with it
or ceased to enjoy its benefits."
204. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1467 (West 1954): "Where several persons, holding by
several titles, are subject to the burden or entitled to the benefit of a covenant running
with the land, it must be apportioned among them according to the value of the prop-
erty subject to it held by them respectively, if such value can be ascertained, and if
not, then according to their respective interests in point of quantity."
205. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1465 (West 1954): "A covenant running with the land
binds those only who acquire the whole estate of the covenantor in some part of the
property."
206. County of Los Angeles v. Wright, 107 Cal. App. 2d 235, 236 P.2d 892 (1951);
Higgins v. Monckton, 28 Cal. App. 2d 723, 83 P.2d 516 (1938).
207. County of Los Angeles v. Wright, 107 Cal. App. 2d 235, 236 P.2d 892 (1951);
Higgins v. Monckton, 28 Cal. App. 2d 723, 83 P.2d 516 (1938).
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of section 1468. Covenants running under amended section 1468 are
expressly exempted from the requirements of section 1465.208
Thus applying the rules of sections 1465 and 1467, suppose A
owns an acre in fee and he grants a quarter acre to B in fee- and
another quarter acre to C in a life estate. B acquires one-fourth of
the burden of any covenant running on A's land because he has ac-
quired one-fourth of the property in fee. C is not liable for the
burden, however, because he did not take the whole estate A had
but a lesser life estate. A has been relieved of one-fourth of the
burden on C's quarter acre. A can, of course, impose the same burden
on C in the grant of the life estate to which he is subject, so that if C
violates the covenant and A is held liable, A can recover from C.
A covenant for the addition of some new thing runs only so far
as the assigns who are expressly mentioned in the covenant. 20 9  If
a transferee is not expressly stated to be bound, he does not acquire
the burden of producing the new thing.
If a covenant is placed in a deed conveying land from A to B
and if B later conveys the land to Y but fails to repeat the provisions
of the covenant in the deed to Y, Y will nonetheless be bound if the
deed from A to B containing the covenant has been recorded. A
subsequent transferee, such as Y, has constructive notice of any cov-
enants in the deeds in his chain of title and is bound thereby.210
The transferee is held to have constructive notice even before he
takes title, therefore, any construction on the property before title
passes must conform to the restrictions. 21'
Defenses to Enforcement
Prior to the 1969 amendments to Civil Code section 1468, most
land use restrictions did not run at law, and thus any action to en-
208. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1468 (West Supp. 1977) provides in pertinent part: "Each
covenant... runs with the land owned by or granted to the covenantor and the land
owned by or granted to the covenantee and shall . . .notwithstanding the provisions
of Section 1465, benefit or be binding upon each successive owner, during his owner-
ship, of any portion of such land affected thereby and upon each person having any
interest therein derived through any owner thereof ...... (emphasis added).
209, Marin County Hosp. Dist. v. Cicurel, 154 Cal. App. 2d 294, 301, 316 P.2d
32, 37 (1957); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1464 (West 1954): "A covenant for the addition
of some new thing to real property, or for the direct benefit of some part of the prop-
erty not then in existence or annexed thereto, when contained in a grant of an estate
in such property, and made by the covenantor expressly for his assigns or to the assigns
of the covenantee, runs with land so far only as the assigns thus mentioned are con-
cerned."
210. Seaton v. Clifford, 24 Cal. App. 3d 46, 49-50, 100 Cal. Rptr. 779, 781 (1972);
Robertson v. Nichols, 92 Cal. App. 2d 201, 207, 206 P.2d 898, 901 (1949).
211. Harrison v. Frye, 148 Cal. App. 2d 626, 627, 307 P.2d 76, 77 (1957).
force the restrictions had to be brought in equity.212  Because the
action was in equity, the court could consider the equitable defenses
of laches, unclean hands, and changed conditions.213  Under section
1468, land use restrictions can now be enforced at law,214 and the
question arises whether a plaintiff seeking only money damages un-
der section 1468 can avoid the equitable defenses.
Despite the merger of the forms of action with the adoption of
code pleading, there still remains a distinction between law and equi-
ty.215 The rule is well established that the equitable defense of
laches is not available in an action for money damages. 216  The rule
is equally well established, however, that the defense of unclean hands
is available in a legal action. 217  Although earlier cases held that the
defense of changed circumstances could not be considered in a legal
action, 218 the more recent cases recognize the defense whether the
restrictions are being enforced in law or equity.21 9
The courts have held that a defendant in a legal action has a
right to set up as many defenses as he has available, whether legal
or equitable.220  Thus in an action for breach of restrictions in which
the plaintiff is seeking only money damages, the courts will consider
the defenses of unclean hands and changed conditions. The only
equitable defense that is not available is laches, but the courts may
find in the place of laches, the legal defense of waiver.
Laches, Waiver, and Estoppel
If a plaintiff delays in making an objection to the violation of a
covenant and the delay causes the defendant to do or refrain from
doing something to the defendant's injury, the plaintiff is guilty of
laches. 221 On the other hand, if the plaintiff acts in such a way as
to warrant the inference that he has chosen to relinquish his legal
right of enforcement, he has waived his cause of action. 222  The dis-
212. See Marra v. Aetna Constr. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 375, 101 P.2d 490 (1940).
213. Id.; Harrison v. Frye, 148 Cal. App. 2d 626, 629-30, 307 P.2d 76, 78 (1957);
Wilkman v. Banks, 124 Cal. App. 2d 451, 456-57, 269 P.2d 33, 36 (1954).
214. See notes 93-96 & accompanying text supra.
215. De Witt v. Hays, 2 Cal. 463, 468-69 (1852).
216. Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 50 Cal. 2d 438, 461, 326 P.2d 484, 498 (1958).
217. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. United Steelworkers Local 1304, 227 Cal.
App. 2d 675, 727-28, 39 Cal. Rptr. 64, 97 (1964).
218. Strong v. Shatto, 45 Cal. App. 29, 37, 187 P. 159, 162 (1919).
219. Hess v. Country Club Park, 213 Cal. 613, 2 P.2d 782 (1931); Townsend v.
Allen, 114 Cal. App. 2d 291, 250 P.2d 292 (1952) (dicta); Letteau v. Ellis, 122 Cal.
App. 584, 10 P.2d 496 (1932).
220. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. United Steelworkers Local 1304, 227 Cal.
App. 2d 675, 728, 39 Cal. Rptr. 64, 97 (1964).
221. Lubin v. Lubin, 144 Cal. App. 2d 781, 794, 302 P.2d 49, 59 (1956).
222. Jones v. Della Maria, 48 Cal. App. 171, 191 P. 943 (1920).
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tinction between laches and waiver is that laches requires the defen-
dant to change his position to his detriment, whereas waiver involves
only the conduct of the plaintiff.2 23  Although waiver must be an in-
tentional relinquishment of a known right, the intent does not have
to be proved. Waiver can be inferred from conduct.22 4
If a plaintiff knows that a defendant is getting ready to pour
the foundation of his house using foundation forms that are over
the sidelines but the plaintiff does not make any objection until after
the foundation is laid, the court may find the plaintiff subject to the
defense of either laches or waiver. He may be subject to the defense
of laches because he waited until the foundation was laid. He may
be subject to the defense of waiver because with knowledge of the
violation he took no immediate action, and it can thus be inferred
he waived any objection. A plaintiff is free of laches or waiver, how-
ever, if he brings an action long after the violation has occurred but
as soon as he learns of it, if there was nothing that should have put
him on notice. 22' The plaintiff is not required to go onto the defen-
dant's land to determine if the use of the property is in conformance
with the restrictions. 226  The implication is that he is only held to
the knowledge that a reasonably prudent person would have acquired
from observations off the property.
Waiver may occur in two different circumstances: if the orig-
inal grantor, the one who extracted the covenants, is seeking to en-
force the restrictions and if subsequent grantees, the present lot own-
ers, are seeking to enforce them. If the grantor has placed uniform
restrictions on some of the property he has conveyed but failed to
place restrictions on other lots, the court may find that he has mani-
fested an intent to abandon his plan of restrictions and has waived
his right to enforce those covenants that were imposed.22 7 In an ac-
tion between subsequent grantees in which one or more lot owners
are seeking to enforce the covenant against another lot owner, waiver
may be found if violations in the tract are so numerous that the de-
fendant lot owner was led to assume that the covenant was no longer
in effect and if the court determines that enforcement of the covenant
against the defendant will not restore the standard.22 s Waiver will
223. Id.; Lubin v. Lubin, 144 Cal. App. 2d 781, 794, 302 P.2d 49, 59 (1956).
224. Jones v. Della Maria, 48 Cal. App. 171, 191 P. 943 (1920); Townsend v.
Allen, 114 Cal. App. 2d 291, 299, 250 P.2d 292, 297 (1952).
225. Wilkrnan v. Banks, 124 Cal. App. 2d 451, 456, 269 P.2d 33, 36 (1954).
226. Morgan v. Veach, 59 Cal. App. 2d 682, 689, 139 P.2d 976, 980 (1943).
227. Townsend v. Allen, 114 Cal. App. 2d 291, 250 P.2d 292 (1952); Wedum-
Aldahl Co. v. Miller, 18 Cal. App. 2d 745, 64 P.2d 762 (1937).
228. Bryant v. Whitney, 178 Cal. 640, 643, 174 P. 32, 33 (1918); Harrison v. Frye,
148 Cal. App. 2d 626, 630, 307 P.2d 76, 78 (1957).
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be found even if the complaining lot owners have not personally vi-
olated the covenant but have failed to object to other violations in
the tract. 229  A number of violations will not constitute a waiver, how-
ever, if the essential purpose of the restrictions has been maintained.23 1
Thus, if an area is restricted to single family residences and over the
years a number of homes have been turned into boarding houses, the
court may find an abandonment of the single family restriction and
hold that the lot owners have waived the right to keep out boarding
houses. Nevertheless, if someone wants to erect a commercial build-
ing in the area, the court could find that boarding houses are within
the residential purpose of the original restrictions and that the com-
mercial use should still be excluded as contrary to the established use
of the area.
If the party bringing suit is in violation of the restrictions, the
courts usually do not say that he has waived his right of enforcement
but that he is barred from enforcing the covenant.23 1  The court is
merely saying the plaintiff has unclean hands. If the plaintiff is in
material violation, one that defeats the purpose of the restriction, he
will be barred from enforcing the restriction against others. 232  Like-
wise, if the plaintiff has violated the same restriction that he seeks to
enforce, he will be barred. 233  If a plaintiff's violation is trivial and
the defendant's violation is material, the plaintiff will not be prevented
from proceeding against the defendant. 234
In California estoppel can be used only as a shield and not as
a sword; it can be used to prevent the enforcement of restrictions,
but it can not be used to stop a violation. For example, a subdivider
who received consideration for releasing restrictions on several par-
cels in the subdivision was estopped from enforcing those same re-
strictions against other property owners. 235  By contrast, a subdivider
who has made oral representations that the land retained is covered
by the restrictions will not be estopped from later asserting the land
is not restricted.23 1 This harsh result stems from the strict California
rule that any intent to place restrictions on land must be evidenced
229. See Harrison v. Frye, 148 Cal. App. 2d 626, 630, 307 P.2d 76, 78 (1957).
230. Robertson v. Nichols, 92 Cal. App. 2d 201, 206 P.2d 898 (1949) (17 viola-
tions out of 117 lots).
231. E.g., Harrison v. Frye, 148 Cal. App. 2d 626, 630, 307 P.2d 76, 78 (1957).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.; see also Seligman v. Tucker, 6 Cal. App. 3d 691, 86 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1970).
235. Alexander v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 48 Cal. App. 2d 488, 119 P.2d 992 (1941).
236. The finding of a possible estoppel in Smith v. Rasqui, 176 Cal. App. 2d 514,
1 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1959), was disapproved in Riley v. Bear Creek Planning Comm., 17
Cal. 3d 500, 512, 551 P.2d 1213, 1222, 131 Cal. Rptr. 381, 390 (1976).
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by a written document. 237  Even if a grantee takes land with actual
knowledge of the restrictions and for several years acts in compliance,
he will not be estopped from violating the restrictions if the grantor
failed to place them in his particular deed.238
Changed Conditions
Restrictive covenants will not be enforced if changed conditions
in the neighborhood have rendered the purpose of the restrictions
obsolete or if it would be oppressive and inequitable to give the re-
strictions effect.23 9  Obviously, each case must be determined on its
own facts.240  The court may find changed conditions in one part of
a neighborhood and not in another, so that the restrictions would be
released only on some parcels and enforced against the rest.241  What-
ever the circumstances of the neighborhood, the court can only ad-
judicate the restrictions on the property belonging to the parties be-
fore the court.242  A decision to release the restrictions on their prop-
erty does not release the restrictions on the rest of the tract belonging
to property owners not before the court. Any determination by the
court to keep the restrictions in force is not res judicata, because the
conditions may continue to change such that at a later time the
court may decide it would be oppressive to keep them in force.243
Factors the court may consider in determining changed circum-
stances include the intrusion of commercial use into a residential
neighborhood, the general deterioration of the neighborhood, and in-
creased traffic, congestion, and noise.244  A rezoning by the city from
residential to some other use may be admitted as evidence of changed
circumstances, but the zoning itself does not affect the enforcement
of private restrictions. 2415  Evidence that the property would be more
valuable if the restrictions were lifted is not considered. 24
237. Riley v. Bear Creek Planning Comm., 17 Cal. 3d 500, 551 P.2d 1213, 131
Cal. Rptr. 381 (1976).
238. Id.
239. Marra v. Aetna Constr. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 375, 378, 101 P.2d 490, 492 (1940);
Hurd v. Albert, 214 Cal. 15, 23, 3 P.2d 545, 548 (1931).
240. See Hurd v. Albert, 214 Cal. 15, 28, 3 P.2d 545, 550 (1931); Robertson v.
Nichols, 92 Cal. App. 2d 201, 207, 206 P.2d 898, 901-02 (1949).
241. Fairchild v. Raines, 24 Cal. 2d 818, 828, 151 P.2d 260, 265 (1944).
242. Hurd v. Albert, 214 Cal. 15, 28, 3 P.2d 545, 550 (1931).
243. Id.
244. Key v. McCabe, 54 Cal. 2d 736, 356 P.2d 169, 8 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1960);
Marra v. Aetna Constr. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 375, 101 P.2d 490 (1940); Hirsch v. Hancock,
173 Cal. App. 2d 745, 343 P.2d 959 (1959).
245. Bard v. Rose, 203 Cal. App. 2d 232, 236, 21 Cal. Rptr. 382, 384 (1962);
Hirsch v. Hancock, 173 Cal. App. 2d 745, 756, 343 P.2d 959, 966 (1959).
246. Marra v. Aetna Constr. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 375, 379, 101 P.2d 490, 493 (1940);
Bolotin v. Rindge, 230 Cal. App. 2d 741, 744, 41 Cal. Rptr. 376, 378 (1964).
The courts have in several cases lifted the restrictions on property
located on the perimeter of a residential tract that faced out onto a
commercial street.2 47  The perimeter property was certainly less de-
sirable for residential use, but allowing a commercial use simply
pushed the problem one block back to the houses on the street behind.
The better view is that the purpose of the restrictions was to prevent
change on the restricted property in the event of change outside the
tract. Therefore, the restrictions should be enforced when the an-
ticipated change has occurred.2 48  Even if there has been change
within the tract, the covenants should be enforced so long as the orig-
inal purpose can be accomplished.
In determining whether conditions have changed, a court sitting
without a jury has wide discretion. The power of the appellate court
to review the trial court's decision is limited to the determination
whether substantial evidence supports the trial court's conclusion.2 49
If the judge makes a personal inspection of the disputed area, his ob-
servations may be used along with other evidence.2 50  Obviously, the
court's decision must be in accord with the evidence. 25 1
Termination
A covenant may cease to be enforceable for a number of different
reasons. The covenant may terminate by its own terms if it was
expressed to run only for a fixed number of years. 252 The courts may
terminate a covenant if neighborhood conditions have so changed
that the purpose of the covenant can no longer be achieved or if the
neighbors have indicated an intention to abandon the restrictions. 25 3
The state may end a covenant if it takes property in eminent domain,
although the state must pay compensation for the resulting decrease
in value to the land that would have received a benefit.254  A change
in zoning, however, does not affect the enforcement of private cov-
enants that are more restrictive than the zoning.2 55
247. Key v. McCabe, 54 Cal. 2d 736, 356 P.2d 169, 8 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1960);
Downs v. Kroeger, 200 Cal. 743, 254 P. 1101 (1927).
248. Fairchild v. Raines, 24 Cal. 2d 818, 827, 151 P.2d 260, 265 (1944); POWELL,
supra note 11, If 684.
249. Bard v. Rose, 203 Cal. App. 2d 232, 235, 21 Cal. Rptr. 382, 383-84 (1962).
250. Hirsch v. Hancock, 173 Cal. App. 2d 745, 760, 343 P.2d 959, 968 (1959);
Harrison v. Frye, 148 Cal. App. 2d 626, 628-29, 307 P.2d 76, 78 (1957).
251. Jewett v. Albin, 90 Cal. App. 535, 546, 266 P. 329, 333 (1928).
252. Diederichsen v. Sutch, 47 Cal. App. 2d 646, 118 P.2d 298 (1941).
253. See notes 227-48 & accompanying text supra.
254. Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Bourgerie, 9 Cal. 3d 169, 507 P.2d 964, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 76 (1973).
255. Hirsch v. Hancock, 173 Cal. App. 2d 745, 756, 343 P.2d 959, 966 (1959);
POWELL, supra note 11, at If 686.
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The owner of land receiving the benefit of a covenant can quit-
claim all his rights and interest in the burdened property and thereby
release the restrictions that run in his favor.256 If the restrictions
run in the favor of many lot owners, however, a release by any one
of them should not affect the right of enforcement of the rest.
The covenant may provide that it can be terminated by a vote
of a certain percentage or number of lot owners, which may be less
than a majority.2 57 If the requisite number vote to end the restric-
tions, the other lot owners cannot object, because they took with no-
tice of the provision that the covenant could be terminated. Con-
versely, if the covenant expires on a fixed date, there may be a pro-
vision for its extension by a vote of a certain percentage of lot owners,
and the losing lot owners cannot complain. 258 They also acquired
their lots with notice of the provisions.
Conclusion
Civil Code section 1468 was dramatically expanded in 1968 and
again in 1969 to allow the running of both burdens and benefits in
covenants contained in a conveyance of land or made between two
landowners. For covenants entered into after 1969, section 1468
should be the controlling law in most cases. The section will not be
applied retroactively to covenants that predate 1968. Therefore Civil
Code sections 1462 and 1460, the pre-amendment provisions of section
1468, and equitable servitudes will still be in effect. For covenants
made after 1969, section 1468 establishes a number of technical re-
quirements that may defeat the running of the covenant, especially
if the courts insist on literal compliance. If the covenant fails to run
under section 1468, it may still run under the provisions of sections
1462 and 1460 or pursuant to the equity powers of the courts.
Sections 1462 and 1460 and equitable servitudes have tradition-
ally been restrictively interpreted, and unreasonably limited in their
application. Sections 1462 and 1460 have been misunderstood by the
courts. Equitable servitudes have become encrusted with so many
rules and distinctions that they have become as technical as covenants
running at law. The courts need to reexamine the provisions of sec-
tions 1462 and 1460 and the basic principle that equity will enforce
a covenant that has failed to run with the land at law. With the
256. Werner v. Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 178, 183 P. 945, 946 (1919); Howard Homes,
Inc. v. Guttman, 190 Cal. App. 2d 526, 530, 12 Cal. Rptr. 244, 246 (1961).
257. See Sharp v. Quinn, 214 Cal. 194, 4 P.2d 942 (1931).
258. Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Riviera Estates Ass'n, 7 Cal. App. 3d 449, 87
Cal. Rptr. 150 (1970).
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combination of sections 1462, 1460, and 1468 and the equity powers
of the court, there should never be a covenant in California that can-
not be enforced if it would be inequitable to allow a transferee to
avoid the restriction.
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